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COMMENT
Crafted from Whole Cloth: Reverse StashHouse Stings and the Sentencing Factor
Manipulation Claim
MOLLY F. SPAKOWSKI†
INTRODUCTION
Kenneth Flowers is currently serving a mandatory
minimum sentence of 120 months imprisonment stemming
from a conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine.1 While the tenyear prison sentence is very real, the five-kilograms of
cocaine is not, and never was. Mr. Flowers was caught-up in
one of the elaborate and overused “reverse stash-house
sting”2 operations employed by the Bureau of Alcohol,

† J.D., 2019, University at Buffalo School of Law; Executive Publications Editor,
Buffalo Law Review. I would like to thank the members of the Buffalo Law
Review, specifically Richard P. Brooks, for their invaluable editing; Professor
Guyora Binder for his insightful revisions to an earlier version of this Comment;
and my family and friends, especially Gabriela A. Tremont and Andrew B.
Plewinski, for their continued faith in me.
1. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 496 (6th Cir. 2017).
2. In a traditional sting, undercover agents pose as buyers. In a reverse
sting, undercover agents act as sellers. A reverse stash-house sting is a “reverse”
sting because like selling, the government is providing the opportunity to rob the
stash-house.
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Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”). His story goes
like this.
ATF Special Agent Richard Zayas has made a career out
of conducting reverse stash-house sting operations, and
unfortunately for Mr. Flowers, Agent Zayas decided to give
his well-worn skillset a try in Cleveland.3 To begin, Agent
Zayas directed a confidential informant to gather general
information about the community and report back any
interesting findings.4 In doing so, the informant approached
an acquaintance named Kali Alexander.5 He and Mr.
Alexander discussed illegal activity, including a possible
firearms sale.6 But while the weapon sale never occurred,
Mr. Alexander did agree to sell the informant heroin.7
Agent Zayas accompanied the informant to the heroin
sale.8 He posed as a disgruntled drug courier and during the
exchange, Agent Zayas proposed to Mr. Alexander an idea to
rob a cocaine stash-house he knew of.9 He said the house
would have about eight to nine kilograms of cocaine stashed
in it and was guarded by two men, at least one of whom was
armed.10 The two discussed the potential robbery and the
possibility of splitting the cocaine 50/50 between Agent
Zayas and Mr. Alexander and anyone who Mr. Alexander
chose to help him assist in the robbery.11 The plan progressed
over the next two weeks and Mr. Alexander brought

3. Flowers, 712 F. App’x at 495. ATF reverse stash-house sting operations
follow nearly identical routines and this case is no different.
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. Mr. Alexander sold the informant and/or Agent Zayas 6.5 grams of
heroin for $900. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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Rasheam Nichols and Justin Maxwell to meet Agent Zayas.12
The four men discussed the details of the plan and Agent
Zayas offered to provide a car for their use on the day of the
robbery.13
On the day of the robbery, Mr. Alexander, Mr. Nichols,
and Mr. Maxwell went to meet up with the informant and
Agent Zayas.14 Accompanying them were Terrance Chappell
and Mr. Flowers.15 Mr. Chappell and Mr. Flowers were
armed.16 This was the first time Agent Zayas met Mr.
Chappell and Mr. Flowers.17 The men discussed the robbery
for a few minutes, going over the plan, resolving questions,
and preparing.18 Agent Zayas told all the men what he had
told Mr. Alexander before—that the stash-house contained
about eight or nine kilograms of cocaine, was guarded by two
men, and at least one of guards was armed.19 Geared up and
ready to go, the informant took the wheel and began to drive
to the stash-house.20 However, they did not go to the
imagined stash-house, and instead, he drove them to a
warehouse where they were all arrested.21
On September 23, 2014, all five defendants, including
Mr. Flowers, were charged with conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and
with using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
drug conspiracy.22 Mr. Flowers had no criminal record and

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 496. Some were charged with additional, varying federal crimes.

454

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

was employed at the time of the fictitious robbery.23 He was
introduced into the scheme by his cousin24 and his eagerness
to make a large sum of money quickly ensnared him in the
ATF’s reverse stash-house sting. Not even the target of the
operation, Mr. Flowers is now serving a mandatory
minimum sentence for a crime he likely would never had
thought to commit but for the government’s creation and
attractive framing of it.
Mr. Flowers’ story is one of many similar cases resulting
from the government operation conducted by the ATF known
as a reverse stash-house sting operation. The ATF’s reverse
stash-house stings developed in the late 1980s to combat a
rise in professional robbery crews targeting stash-houses.25
The operations have grown extremely controversial in recent
years because they “empower law enforcement to craft
offenses out of whole cloth.”26
The government, being the sole creator of the operation,
wields a dangerously unfettered amount of power. In
creating the robbery, it is the government that chooses the
quantity of drug to be robbed, the type of drug to be robbed,
and the obstacles a target must overcome during the robbery.
These elements correlate exactly to the defendant’s sentence
length. Therefore, the discretion the government has to
manipulate these elements allows it full control over the
amount of time the defendant spends in prison.27
This dubious imbalance of power in the hands of the
government spurred the creation of the court-created
constitutional doctrine of sentencing factor manipulation.
Sentencing manipulation is a violation of the Due Process
Clause. “Sentencing factor manipulation occurs ‘where
government agents have improperly enlarged the scope or
23. Id. at 496–97.
24. Id. at 497.
25. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2017).
26. Id.
27. Flowers, 712 F. App’x at 509 (Stranch, J., dissenting).
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scale of [a] crime.’”28 When a court determines the
government has engaged in such manipulation, the court has
the “power to impose a sentence below the statutory
mandatory minimum as an equitable remedy.”29
A claim of sentencing factor manipulation is raised by
the defendant at the time of sentencing. Under the claim, the
defendant argues the government, by and through its law
enforcement officers, unduly influenced the factors relevant
to determining sentence length, in a manner that exposed
him to a longer and usually mandatory prison sentence. The
sentencing factor manipulation doctrine is grounded in the
doctrine of entrapment and the due process based doctrine of
outrageous government conduct. It is highly applicable to
cases of reverse stash-house stings.
This Comment proposes adopting a modified sentencing
factor manipulation claim that can be brought by defendants
in reverse stash-house sting cases. Part I explains how a
reverse stash-house sting is conducted and briefly examines
why the reverse stash-house stings are becoming more and
more disfavored in federal courts. Part II describes the
historical and doctrinal underpinnings of the sentencing
factor manipulation claim, including a close examination of
the entrapment defense, the due process based outrageous
government conduct claim, and the structure of sentencing
in the federal courts. Part III examines the current state of
the sentencing factor manipulation claim across the federal
circuit courts. Finally, Part IV discusses why the sentencing
factor manipulation claim is so relevant to reverse stashhouse sting cases, distinguishes other defenses and claims
that are less applicable, and proposes a version of the
sentencing factor manipulation claim to be adopted.

28. United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2017) (alteration
in original) (quoting United States v. Lucena-Rivera, 750 F.3d 43, 55 (1st Cir.
2014)).
29. Id. (quoting United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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I. THE REVERSE STASH-HOUSE STING
A. Explanation of the Operations
Sting operations have been utilized by law enforcement
officers for decades. Reverse sting operations started in the
1980s with “reverse buys”—instead of posing as a buyer, an
undercover law enforcement agent poses as a seller and the
defendant violates the law when he buys whatever illegal
product the undercover agent is selling.30 Reverse stashhouse stings follow reverse stings in that the government
offers the illegal opportunity to the defendant. The ATF
created reverse stash-house stings in Miami in the early
1990s.31 Drug cartels moving large quantities of cocaine into
South Florida attracted “freelance criminals” seeking to
poach the shipments.32 This in turn resulted in shootouts and
many innocent deaths.33 The ATF combatted the freelance
criminals using the reverse stash-house sting.34
Over 1,000 people have been prosecuted in nearly
identical operations conducted by the ATF across the
country.35 The protocol used in the operations is the same
every time and proceeds as follows. A confidential informant
working with the ATF selects a person (the target) he
believes can be enticed into robbing a house used to store

30. Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States:
Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1055, 1055–60 (1993). “Abscam and the pursuit of John DeLorean are perhaps
the most notorious federal reverse sting operations.” Id. at 1058.
31. Brad Heath, ATF Uses Fake Drugs, Big Bucks to Snare Suspects, USA
TODAY (June 28, 2013, 11:26 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/nation/2013/06/27/atf-stash-houses-sting-usa-today-investigation/2457109/.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The ATF now has reverse stash-house sting operations in nearly half
the states. Id.
35. Id.
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drugs awaiting distribution (stash-house).36 The informant
identifies the target to an ATF agent.37 The undercover ATF
agent then approaches the target and poses as a disgruntled
drug courier.38 The agent tells the target he has knowledge
about a stash-house containing a large quantity of cocaine
and suggests they join forces to rob the house and spilt the
proceeds.39 Sometimes the agent suggests armed men guard
the house, sometimes the agent suggests the target recruit
others to help in the robbery, sometimes the agent suggests
he can supply the extra manpower, sometimes the agent
suggests the use of firearms, and sometimes the agent
suggests he will provide the transportation on the day of the
robbery.40
Once the target or targets have taken steps to rob the
stash-house, they are all apprehended and charged with
conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws, as well as a
variety of other federal crimes.41 The only problem is . . . the
house, the drugs, and the guards with guns are all
fictitious—the whole scheme nothing more than a fiction
authored by the government. Because the reverse stashhouse sting operations are wholly the inventions of ATF
agents, they have drawn criticism from not only the
judiciary, but from news reporting and scholarly writings.
B. Precarious Legal Position
The ATF reverse stash-house sting operations have
serious misgivings that have placed them in a precarious and
near fatal legal position. On their face and in actuality, the
operations do not achieve the government’s declared goal of

36. United States v. Pedrin, 797 F.3d 792, 794 (9th Cir. 2015).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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making communities safer.42 Preexisting criminal
enterprises are not targeted and no already existing drug
rings or conspiracies are broken up as a result of the
operations.43 Often times, targets have little to no criminal
record and are not the type of serious or violent offender one
would expect the government to be targeting.44 The crime
proposed by the government is a “massive” one, and
“somewhat baffling,” as the persons who the government
targets do “not have ‘massive’ criminal histories to match.”45
In some cases, the target is a reformed offender with a minor
criminal history who has obtained gainful employment and
worked to reestablish his place in society.46 His success is
immediately destroyed when he cannot resist the half-amillion-dollar payday touted by an undercover ATF agent
and is subsequently placed back into the criminal justice
system.47
The operations are always scripted as a “big-hit”—a
robbery of a stash-house containing an amount of drugs that
will result in a lucrative and nearly irresistible payday.48 The
ATF uses this powerful inducement without fail and the
quantity of drugs imagined is always enough to qualify for
mandatory minimum sentences.49 Furthermore, there just
seems to be something inherently unfair with the fiction that
is a reverse stash-house sting operation. The government is
prosecuting a defendant “as if fantasy had been reality.”50
Every element in the reverse stash-house sting is a falsity

42. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 509 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stranch,
J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. United States v. McKenzie, 656 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2011).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2017).
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dreamed up by the government, from the nonexistent drugs
to the nonexistent house, yet the “ironclad mandatory
minimum” the defendant serves is in fact existent and very
much a painstaking reality.51
Moreover, the government “create[s] a criminal
enterprise that would not have come into being but for the
temptation of a big payday, a work of fiction spun out by
government agents to persons vulnerable to such a ploy who
would not otherwise have thought of doing such a robbery.”52
Absent the government’s manufacture, the crime would not
have existed. A former ATF supervisor has been quoted as
saying, “Do you want police to solve crimes, or do you want
them to go out and prevent crimes that haven’t occurred
yet?”53 Arguably, most would answer government resources
are not best used in the practice of inventing fake crimes.
Lastly, the stings present a great danger of racial
profiling. “People of color are allegedly swept up in the stings
in disproportionate numbers.”54 While the ATF follows a
protocol for reverse stash-house sting operations, the
operations are “arbitrary and indiscriminate when it comes
to the initial identification of suspects.”55 A confidential
informant for the government selects individuals that seem
likely to fall prey to an ATF sting.56 This lack of specificity
has led several defendants to argue the operations are
racially discriminatory and this controversy recently hit an
51. Id. at 211.
52. United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 303 (9th Cir. 2013).
53. Heath, supra note 31.
54. Washington, 869 F.3d at 197.
55. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 934 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
56. Id. Aside from racial profiling, the selection process presents a problem in
relation to culpability. The ATF conducts a background investigation on the
individual to determine if his criminal history makes him a good target. Id.
However, the background investigation “does not necessarily reveal whether the
subject has ever engaged in criminal activity of the magnitude contemplated by
the sting.” Id. at 934–35. Just because an individual has dealt drugs or used
firearms in the pursuit of crime does not mean he is inclined to deal drugs in the
quantities proposed by the government. See id. at 935.
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all-time high in Chicago.57 District judges joined together
several reverse stash-house cases in order to hold an
unprecedented joint hearing to hear testimony on issues of
racial profiling in these operations.58 The court found that
between 2006 and 2013, 78.7% percent of the defendants
charged in the stash-house stings were black, 9.6% were
Hispanic, and 11.7% were white.59
The first judge to write as a result of the hearing was
Chief Judge Castillo.60 While he found the operations to be
plagued with racial overtones, he ultimately did not dismiss
the charges against the defendants.61 He acknowledged the
tension between law enforcement procedures and the
country’s racially diverse community62 but stated in his 73page opinion that the defendants fell short of proving that
the reverse stash-house stings unfairly targeted blacks and
Hispanics.63 Chief Judge Castillo has also expressed his
frustrations with the operations outside of his opinion. At a
prior hearing, he told the government, “This isn’t about
winning cases. It’s about doing justice. Some of these
defendants have already served a lot of time. The
government needs to think about that and needs to think
about it very, very seriously.”64
II. BACKGROUND: THE HISTORICAL AND DOCTRINAL
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SENTENCING FACTOR MANIPULATION

57. Jason Meisner, Federal Judge Finds ATF Drug Stash House Stings
Distasteful but Not Racially Biased, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 2018, 6:15 AM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-atf-drug-stashhouse-ruling-20180309-story.html.
58. Id.
59. United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 983 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
60. Id.; Meisner, supra note 57.
61. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d at 986, 1022.
62. Id. at 985.
63. Id. at 986; Meisner, supra note 57.
64. Meisner, supra note 57.
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CLAIM
The sentencing factor manipulation claim is a courtcreated doctrine rooted in the entrapment defense and the
due process based claim of outrageous government conduct.
The entrapment defense can be formulated either
subjectively or objectively. The principles behind the
objective formulation of the entrapment defense are the very
principles that run rampant through the formulations of the
sentencing factor manipulation claim.
The objective formulation of the entrapment defense
spurred another sort of quasi-objective formulation based
upon due process principles. Arguably, this quasi-objective
formulation morphed into the outrageous government
conduct claim. Nevertheless, the outrageous government
conduct defense is firmly rooted in due process principles on
its own accord. The outrageous government conduct claim, in
turn, spawned the sentencing factor manipulation claim,
which is also firmly rooted in the same due process
principles.
The sentencing factor manipulation claim parallels both
the objective formulation of the entrapment defense and the
outrageous government conduct claim. The objective
formulation of the entrapment defense, the outrageous
government conduct claim, and the sentencing factor
manipulation claim all focus on the actions of law
enforcement officers.
Furthermore, the advent of mandatory minimum
sentencing laws and the creation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines took sentencing discretion away from the
judiciary. In an attempt to regain some power, courts began
to consider defenses that allowed them circumspection at the
time of sentencing—thus the sentencing factor manipulation
claim started to gain applicability in the eyes of the courts.
The entrapment defense, outrageous government conduct
claim, and federal sentencing structure will each be
discussed in turn.

462

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

A. The Entrapment Defense
Entrapment is the defense that a “law enforcement
officer used excessive temptation or urging to wrongfully
induce the defendant[] to commit a crime [he] would not have
ordinarily committed.”65 It exists entirely in case law at the
federal level. Entrapment as a defense did not achieve
general acceptance until well into the twentieth century and
it was harshly rejected in the early New York case of Board
of Commissioners v. Backus when the court used the now
famous Biblical analogy to declare:
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to exist in
this case, the allegation of the defendant would be but the repetition
of the pleas as ancient as the world, and first interposed in Paradise:
“The serpent beguiled me and I did eat.” That defence was overruled
by the great Lawgiver, and whatever estimate we may form, or
whatever judgment pass upon the character or conduct of the
tempter, this plea has never since availed to shield crime or give
indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of
civilized, not to say christian ethics, it never will.66

Although initially rejected, the defense continued to
arise in several influential nineteenth and early twentieth
century cases and laid attacks on the propriety of
governmental involvement in crime.67 It eventually gained
traction when several state courts and lower federal courts
began crediting entrapment as a defense.
The defense was solidified when the Supreme Court first
considered it in Sorrells v. United States and formally
recognized entrapment as a defense.68 The Court held “when
65. THOMAS J. GARDNER & TERRY M. ANDERSON, CRIMINAL LAW 185 (13th ed.
2018).
66. 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
67. See e.g., Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413 (1928); Woo Wai v. United
States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); People v. Mills, 70 N.E. 786 (N.Y. 1904).
68. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Sorrells, a government prohibition agent visited
Sorells’ home. Id. at 439–40. Sorrells was a North Carolina factory worker who
served in World War I. Id. The agent represented himself as a fellow veteran and
during their visit, twice asked Sorrells to procure liquor for him, to which Sorrells
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the criminal design originates, not with the accused, but is
conceived in the mind of the government officers, and the
accused is by persuasion . . . lured into the commission of a
criminal act, the government is estopped by sound public
policy from prosecution.”69 The majority, authored by Chief
Justice Hughes, found entrapment as a defense was not
merely that the crime was committed at the insistence of the
government, but that the key factor to consider was “[t]he
predisposition and criminal design of the defendant.”70 This
has become known as the “subjective” test and is followed in
all federal and most state courts.71 Under this formation, the
focus is on the defendant’s predisposition—once the
defendant has demonstrated improper government
inducement, the government has the opportunity to show the
defendant was predisposed to engage in the illegal conduct—
a lack of predisposition renders the entrapment defense valid
for the defendant.72
However, in his concurring opinion, Justice Roberts took
strong issue with the majority’s construction, and instead
proposed that the key factor in evaluating entrapment was
the conduct of the law enforcement officers.73 He wrote,
twice refused. Id. The agent asked a third time while reminiscing over war stories
and this time Sorrells obtained a bottle of whiskey for $5. Id. He was then
arrested for violating the National Prohibition Act. Id. at 438. The government
called witnesses to show Sorrells had a reputation as a rumrunner, but there was
no evidence Sorells had ever previously possessed or sold liquor. Id. at 441.
69. Id. at 445 (quoting Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th Cir.
1924)).
70. Id. at 451.
71. Fred Warren Bennett, From Sorrells to Jacobson: Reflections on Six
Decades of Entrapment Law, and Related Defenses in Federal Court, 27 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 829, 834–35 (1992).
72. The Court explained the burden shifting nature of the entrapment in
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372–73 (1958). The Sherman Court
credited the Sorrells Court with having outlined the entrapment defense as when
“the accused . . . examine[s] the conduct of the government . . . and [then] . . . the
accused [is] subjected to an ‘appropriate and searching inquiry into his own
conduct and predisposition.’” Id. (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451); see also
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550–54 (1992).
73. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 456–59 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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“[e]ntrapment is the conception and planning of an offense
by an officer, and . . . its commission by one who would not
have perpetrated it except for the trickery.”74 He relied on
well-established public policy grounds to argue that courts
should refuse their aid in schemes where “the actual creation
of a crime [was] by those whose duty [it was] to deter its
commission.”75 No weighing of equities between the guilty
officer and the guilty defendant are necessary—where the
government officer instigated the crime, the courts should be
closed to prosecution.76 This has become known as the
“objective”77 test and under this evaluation, the
predisposition of the defendant is irrelevant—the focus is on
the conduct of the law enforcement officers and whether the
acts of the officers were likely to induce an ordinary citizen
to commit the crime.78
While Justice Roberts’ construction was not adopted, the
disparity between the opinions has clouded the entrapment
defense ever since. The dispute arose again nearly thirtyyears later in Sherman v. United States,79 where the Court
considered entrapment for a second time. The case resulted
in a five Justice majority opinion and a four Justice
concurrence.80 Justice Warren penned the majority, and
finding for the defendant, stated, “[t]o determine whether
entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn
between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for
74. Id. at 454.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 459.
77. The objective test can also be traced back to Justice Brandeis’ dissenting
opinion in Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928). The Court refused to
consider the entrapment defense.
78. Bennett, supra note 71 at 836–37. If the inducements offered by law
enforcement were of the sort to which a normally law-abiding citizen would have
responded, then the defendant who committed a crime in response to such
inducements cannot be convicted. RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 791 (4th ed. 2016).
79. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
80. Id.
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the unwary criminal.”81 He declined to reassess Justice
Roberts’ entrapment model proposed in his Sorrells
concurrence,82 and instead relied on the facts to conclude
there was no evidence that the defendant was predisposed to
break the law.83
The concurrence, written by Justice Frankfurter, again
advocated for the objective test for entrapment and relied on
Justice Roberts’ concurrence in Sorrells.84 He asserted
entrapment should be located in the conduct of the officers
and “the prevailing theory of the Sorrells case ought not to
be deemed the last word” because it was the Court’s “first
attempt at an explanation” of the entrapment defense.85 He
made arguments based upon Congressional intent and public
policy, asserting the courts should turn their backs to
“enforcement of the law by lawless means.”86 However, his
most notable point came when he foreshadowed what was
soon to become a prominent due process claim against
entrapment, when he said, “[t]he courts refuse to convict an
entrapped defendant . . . because even if his guilt be
admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the
[g]overnment to bring about conviction cannot be
countenanced.”87 This line inadvertently laid the
groundwork for a due process based theory that would arise
nearly two decades later.
Entrapment did not come before the Court again until
the 1970s, when the government came out on the winning
side both times—in United States v. Russell88 and Hampton

81. Id. at 372.
82. Id. at 376.
83. Id. at 373–76.
84. Id. at 378–79 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 379.
86. Id. at 379, 380.
87. Id. at 380.
88. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
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v. United States.89 Russell resulted in a 5–4 split with two
separate dissents.90 Justice Douglas authored the first
dissent and took adamant issue with the majority’s
continued adoption of the subjective test for entrapment; he
argued the defendant should be excused via the entrapment
defense because regardless of the defendant’s “inclinations to
criminality, or the depths to which he has sunk in the
estimation of society, certain police conduct to ensnare him
into further crime is not to be tolerated by an advanced
society.”91 Justice Douglas found the government to not only
be the instigator of the crime but a partner in its commission
and the “creative brain behind the illegal scheme.”92
Justice Stewart wrote the second dissent in Russell and
took similar adamant issue with the majority’s refusal to
hold the government accountable for its contributory
actions;93 he asserted, the government may not “create a
crime and then punish the criminal, its creature.”94 More
prominently though, he not only pointedly argued against
the subjective test and advocated for the objective test, but
also articulated each clearly and comparatively.95 In his
opinion, the entrapment defense demands an approach that
focuses on the conduct of the government rather than on the
predispositions of the defendant.96 The predisposition of the
defendant is a moot point when considering entrapment, as
the defendant has conceded commission and therefore shown
he was in fact predisposed to commit the crime in the sense

89. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
90. 411 U.S. 423.
91. Id. at 437 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Sherman, 356 U.S. at 382–83
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
92. Id. at 439.
93. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. Id. (quoting Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
95. Id. at 440–41.
96. Id. at 441.
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that he was capable of its commission.97 He believed the
objective test was better tailored to and more consistent with
the purpose of the entrapment defense: to “prohibit unlawful
governmental activity in instigating crime.”98
While the majority, authored by Justice Rehnquist, stood
by the subjective test, it did take the time to weigh the
considerations of both tests.99 Russell urged the Court to
adopt the objective test in his appeal and consider not his
state of mind, but only the conduct of the government
officers.100 Authentically, he relied on constitutional grounds
to argue the officers were such vital participants in the
criminal scheme and so overly involved in the ploy that
criminally prosecuting him would violate the fundamental
principles of due process.101 The Court found Russell’s
argument did not fit the facts of his own case because the
criminal scheme at issue could have been, and previously
had been, carried out without the help of the government
officers.102 Therefore, their aid and involvement stopped
short of violating the fairness principles mandated by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.103
But, the Court did not dispose of his argument in
whole104: “we may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous
that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction.”105 This line has reverberated throughout
discussions regarding the entrapment defense ever since, but
97. Id. at 442.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 427–31 (majority opinion).
100. Id. at 430.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 431.
103. Id. at 432.
104. Id. at 431–32.
105. Id.
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has also taken shape as a new and separate claim to be
brought by a defendant at trial, which is discussed infra.
The subjective versus objective test debate over the
entrapment defense raged on in Hampton,106 but it was the
last case that featured this conflict in the context of
entrapment.107 The majority of the Court relied on the
subjective test, finding Hampton was predisposed to selling
drugs regardless of the supplier,108 and the dissent relied on
the objective test, finding the government’s actions in
outright supplying the illegal drugs was unacceptably
beyond permissible limits.109 For the purposes of this
Comment, Hampton is more relevantly discussed infra.
The last and most recent consideration of the
entrapment defense by the Supreme Court was in Jacobson
v. United States110 and legal scholars have deemed it to be
the resurrection of the entrapment defense.111 The Court
found for the defendant, reaffirming the principle that
“[w]hen the [g]overnment’s quest for convictions leads to the
apprehension of an otherwise law-abiding citizen who, if left
to his own devices, likely would have never run afoul of the
law, the courts should intervene.”112 The case received
noteworthy amounts of press, and one reporter described the
106. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
107. Paul Marcus, Presenting, Back from the [Almost] Dead, the Entrapment
Defense, 47 FLA. L. REV. 205, 214 (1995). The debate was furious for a long time,
but Justice Brennan, the last major proponent of the objective test conceded the
point in the 1988 case of Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66–67 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring).
108. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 488–91. The case resulted in a plurality—the
majority of Justices (5–3) agreed the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime. Id. at 485 (plurality opinion). But, two Justices penned a concurrence in
which they disagreed with the plurality on a separate point. Id. at 491 (Powell,
J., concurring). The dissenting three Justices disagreed in full. Id. at 495
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 495–500 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
110. 503 U.S. 540 (1992).
111. Marcus, supra note 107, at 211.
112. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 553–54.
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government’s conduct as “an extreme misuse of . . . power in
which an innocent person was led to commit a manufactured
crime.”113 This idea of “manufactured” crime that surrounded
the Jacobson case was the building block on which lower
federal court judges relied when they began to confront the
surge of ATF reverse stash-house sting operations in the
early 2010s.
B. The Outrageous Government Conduct Claim
The Russell case and Justice Rehnquist’s “we may some
day” language within it have been deemed the birth of the
outrageous government conduct claim.114 The claim,
grounded in due process principles and raised by the
defendant, asserts that the officers’ conduct relating to the
crime was so outrageous that it bars the government from
invoking judicial process.115 The standard for a dismissal
based on the actions of the law enforcement officers is very
high and conduct is only considered outrageous when it
violates “fundamental fairness” and “shock[s] . . . the
universal sense of justice mandated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”116
The claim was first raised by a defendant in Hampton v.
United States.117 The defendant argued the government’s
role in supplying him with illegal drugs to sell fell within the

113. Linda Greenhouse, Justices, in Entrapment Case, Cast a Rare Vote
Against Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 1992, https://www.nytimes.com/
1992/04/07/us/justices-in-entrapment-case-cast-a-rare-vote-againstprosecutors.html.
114. Stephen A. Miller, Comment, The Case for Preserving the Outrageous
Government Conduct Defense, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 305, 314 (1996) (“With this
somewhat cryptic statement, the outrageous government conduct defense was
born.”).
115. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973).
116. Id. at 432 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also United States v.
Garza-Juarez, 992 F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing outrageous conduct
as “so excessive, flagrant, scandalous, intolerable and offensive”).
117. 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976).
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sort of “outrageous government conduct” Justice Rehnquist
pondered in Russell.118 He argued this outrageous conduct
constituted a violation of his due process rights.119 Justice
Rehnquist, writing for three members of the Court, was not
impressed. Justice Rehnquist opined the defendant
misunderstood his commentary in Russell and attempted to
destroy the very doctrine he created: “the police conduct here
no more deprived defendant of any right secured to him by
the United States Constitution than did the police conduct in
Russell deprive Russell of any rights.”120
However, Justice Rehnquist did not capture the majority
of the court and two Justices joined in a concurrence that
specifically disagreed with Justice Rehnquist’s viewpoint on
the outrageous government conduct claim: “I am unwilling
to conclude that an analysis . . . would never be appropriate
under due process principles.”121 The three dissenting
Justices shared similar feelings, claiming the officers’ actions
transcended permissible limits in that “[t]he beginning and
end of this crime . . . coincided exactly with the
[g]overnment’s entry into and withdrawal from the criminal
activity.”122 Thus, five Justices, a majority of the Court,
recognized the viability of an outrageous government
conduct claim based upon due process principles.
Yet, this fractured holding created immense confusion,
and the Court’s failure to revisit the claim since its
articulation has permitted varying degrees of application of
the claim in lower federal courts in the following years.123
Some circuit courts have rejected the outrageous government
conduct claim completely,124 some have accepted it but only
118. Id. at 489.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 490–91.
121. Id. at 493.
122. Id. at 498 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
123. See Miller, supra note 114, at 315.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239 (7th Cir. 1995); United States
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used it in application once or twice,125 and some have
recognized its viability but have yet to find a case where it
applies because of their impossibly high standard for
outrageousness.126
Among the courts that recognize the claim but have
declined to apply it thus far are the First, Second, Fourth,
Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits.127 Their
standard for outrageousness bars application of the claim
even when the defendant has accurately presented it.128 The
First Circuit reserves the application of the claim for the
most egregious and despicable situations, in which the
government has been so overly involved in the crime so that
it is as if the government has wholly created the criminal
venture.129 The Second Circuit applies the claim only when
the government’s conduct offends common notions of
decency, and departing slightly from the First Circuit’s
standard, it has said “coaching [the defendant] in how to
commit the crime” does not qualify as outrageous conduct.130
The Fourth Circuit takes a similar stance to that of the
Second Circuit. The conduct of the government must shock
or offend traditional notions of fairness in order to violate due
process and the court has never held government conduct to
violate this standard.131

v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 718 F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Augustin, 661
F.3d 1105 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829 (8th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Guzman, 282 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2002); see also United States v.
Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing the doctrine but failing to have
yet applied it).
127. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
129. See Guzman, 282 F.3d at 59; United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 5 (1st
Cir. 1993).
130. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 121.
131. Hasan, 718 F.3d at 343.
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The Fifth Circuit has stated the defendant bears an
extremely high burden,132 the Eighth Circuit has held the
government’s conduct must fall within a very “narrow band”
of the “most intolerable” types of conduct,133 and the
Eleventh Circuit has asserted the claim will only be applied
in the most rare and outrageous cases.134 Interestingly, the
D.C. Circuit has not “rule[d] out the possibility of finding
valid a defense of outrageous government conduct,” but it
limits the defense to government conduct “involving
‘coercion, violence, or brutality to the person.’”135 The Tenth
Circuit also recognizes the claim and has yet to apply it, but
it has provided more guidance on the outrageousness
standard.136 The defendant must show undue government
involvement in the creation of the crime or considerable
governmental coercion to induce the crime.137 The
government cannot “engineer and direct the criminal
enterprise from start to finish”138 and it cannot “generate[]
new crime for the purpose of prosecuting it or induce[] a
defendant to become involved for the first time in certain
criminal activity.”139
The two circuits that recognize the outrageous
government conduct claim and have actually applied it,
albeit only once or twice, are the Third and Ninth Circuits.
They each have reversed a conviction, having deemed the
government’s conduct so outrageous as to violate due process
principles; these are the only two reported Court of Appeals
132. United States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2003).
133. United States v. Boone, 437 F.3d 829, 841 (8th Cir. 2006) (internal citation
omitted).
134. United States v. Augustin, 661 F.3d 1105, 1123 (11th Cir. 2011).
135. United States v. Caviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1533–34 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting
United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1330 (1995)).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Dyke, 718 F.3d 1282, 1287–88 (10th Cir. 2013).
137. Id. at 1288; United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994).
138. United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 911 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting
United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1983)).
139. Id. at 911.
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cases that have found a violation of due process on
outrageous government conduct grounds.140
In United States v. Twigg, the Third Circuit found “the
nature and extent of police involvement in [the] crime was so
overreaching as to bar prosecution of the defendants as a
matter of due process of law.”141 In Twigg, the Drug
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) asked an informant to
approach the defendant with the suggestion of building a
methamphetamine laboratory.142 The DEA supplied all the
necessary materials, including glassware, isolated farmland
on which to build the laboratory, and a difficult to obtain,
indispensable chemical ingredient.143 The defendant did not
know how to produce methamphetamine and followed the
instructions of the informant completely.144 The DEA was
completely in charge and provided the technical expertise
necessary for the operation.145 Furthermore, when a problem
was encountered in the scheme, threatening its halt, the
DEA readily found a solution.146 Based upon these facts, the
court had “no trouble in concluding that the governmental
involvement in the criminal activities . . . [had] reached a
‘demonstrable level of outrageousness.’”147
In Greene v. United States,148 the Ninth Circuit found the
government’s conduct so outrageous as to have violated due

140. United States v. Combs, 827 F.3d 790, 795 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We are aware
of only two reported court of appeals decisions—both from the 1970s—that have
deemed the government’s conduct so outrageous as to violate due process.”);
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Greene, 454
F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
141. 588 F.2d at 377.
142. Id. at 375.
143. Id. at 375–76.
144. Id. at 381.
145. Id. at 375.
146. Id. at 380.
147. Id.
148. 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).
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process.149 It reversed the defendants’ conviction on charges
related to an illegal bootlegging operation.150 In Greene, an
undercover government agent was intricately involved in the
illegal bootlegging operation for over two years.151 He offered
to supply, and did supply, necessary materials, an operator,
a location for the still, and sugar at discounted prices. 152 He
also adamantly encouraged the revival of the operation,
threatened the defendants to accelerate production, and was
the sole purchaser of the illegal liquor produced.153 Based on
the facts, the court held “the [g]overnment may [not] involve
itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of
time in the ‘creation’ and maintenance of criminal
operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators.”154 It found
the government’s conduct rose to a level “repugnant to [the]
American criminal justice” system.155
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court that has
identified a set of relevant factors to be used in assessing a
claim of outrageous government conduct.156 United States v.
Black is the seminal case for the claim because of the
guidance the court provided for its evaluation. The court
articulated a totality of the circumstances analysis,
identifying the following six factors as relevant in
determining if the government’s conduct was so outrageous
149. The defendants argued entrapment on appeal, not an outrageous
government conduct claim. Id. at 786. The court did not find entrapment as a
matter of law (under the subjective test) because the defendants were
predisposed to manufacture and sell bootleg whiskey. Id. However, the court
relied on the objective test for entrapment to hold the government’s conduct
outrageous. See id. at 787. See also United States v. Combs, 827 F.3d 790, 795
(8th Cir. 2016) (“The Ninth Circuit found a due process violation in Greene v.
United States . . . .”).
150. Greene, 454 F.2d at 783–84.
151. Id. at 786.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 787.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294 (9th Cir. 2013).
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as to bar conviction:
(1) known criminal characteristics of the defendants; (2)
individualized suspicion of the defendants; (3) the government’s role
in creating the crime of conviction; (4) the government’s
encouragement of the defendants to commit the offense conduct; (5)
the nature of the government’s participation in the offense conduct;
and (6) the nature of the crime being pursued and necessity for the
actions taken in light of the nature of the criminal enterprise at
issue.157

It also provided loose limits for what is and is not
considered to be outrageous: it is outrageous for the
government to engineer the criminal ploy from beginning to
end, to use excessive mental or physical coercion, or to
generate new crime for the sake of prosecution, but it is not
outrageous for the government to infiltrate an existing
criminal organization, to approach a known criminal with a
criminal act, or to provide items necessary in the criminal
scheme.158
Black did not result in reversal of the defendant’s
convictions but it did produce some of the most noteworthy
comments on ATF reverse stash-house sting operations.159
While Black attempted to provide some clarification
regarding the outrageous government conduct claim, the
confusion surrounding its viability and applicability
continues on.160 The outrageous government conduct claim
laid the foundation for the sentencing factor manipulation
claim, and in many ways the latter parallels the former. Both
claims maintain a primary focus on the actions of the law
enforcement officers and both fall within the broader
category of due process violations. But while the outrageous
government conduct claim is an attack on the conviction
itself, the sentencing factor manipulation claim is a more
157. Id. at 303.
158. Id. at 302.
159. See id. at 313 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
160. Several district courts have attempted to apply the outrageous
government conduct claim.
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narrow attack on the actual sentence.161
C. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory
Minimum Sentence Statutes
The creation of mandatory minimum sentencing laws
and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”)
inevitably begged for a defense or claim to counteract the
increased discretion given to the government and taken
away from the courts in charging and sentencing offenses.
Congress enacted the Guidelines in 1987.162 By enacting the
Guidelines, Congress intended to minimize judicial
discretion in the sentencing process and eliminate
disparities in sentences between similarly situated
defendants.163 The Guidelines took away the courts’
previously wide discretion to determine the appropriate
sentence in a defendant’s individual case.164
Separate from the Guidelines, Congress has also
legislated mandatory minimum sentences for specific
crimes.165 Federal statutes are laced with mandatory
minimum provisions. Mandatory minimum sentencing laws
require a court to impose a specific sentence length for
defendants convicted of certain federal crimes. A specific
attribute of a crime triggers a minimum sentence statute—
for example, if a defendant possesses a machine gun in
relation to a violent crime or drug-trafficking crime, a
mandatory minimum sentence of thirty years is triggered

161. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 197 (3d Cir. 2017).
162. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A2 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 1992).
163. SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
POLICY STATEMENTS 8 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1987).

AND

164. Eric P. Berlin, Comment, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Failure to
Eliminate Sentencing Disparity: Governmental Manipulations Before Arrest,
1993 WIS. L. REV. 187, 187 (1993).
165. Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, The
Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1851 (1995).
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because of the presence of the machine gun.166 If the
defendant had possessed a handgun instead, he would only
be facing a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.167 At
sentencing, when a mandatory minimum length is in conflict
with the calculated Guidelines sentence length, the
mandatory minimum takes precedent over the Guidelines.168
A judge is required to impose the mandatory minimum, but
under United States v. Booker, is not required to impose a
sentence within the Guidelines so long as he considers the
wider range of sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).169
To calculate a sentence under the Guidelines, a judge
examines the defendant’s relevant conduct to determine the
offense base level, makes mitigating adjustments to the
offense base level, and selects the defendant’s criminal
history level.170 Where offense level and criminal history
level intersect on the grid contained within the Guidelines,
determines the defendant’s sentence length, or the range of
months for which the defendant must be imprisoned.171 The
defendant’s sentence is therefore, under the Guidelines,
primarily determined by the amount of harm attributed to,
or resulting from, the offense the defendant committed.172
This harm-based penology, “results in a heavy focus on
the amount or quantity of, for example, drugs sold, money

166. 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2018).
167. 18 U.S.C § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (2018). In total, he would be facing ten years—
five years for the drug trafficking charges and five years for the presence of the
handgun.
168. Oliss, supra note 165, at 1854.
169. 543 U.S. 220, 221 (2005).
170. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N
1992).
171. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2018). For example, using the Sentencing Table, an offense level of ten
and a criminal history category of III corresponds to an imprisonment term of ten
to sixteen months. Id.
172. Berlin, supra note 164, at 195.
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stolen, money laundered, money embezzled, or taxes
evaded.”173 Thus, punishments for drug and money offenses
increase at a rate proportional to the amount or quantity of
drugs or money involved in the offense.174 This quantitybased approach takes the focus away from the defendant’s
culpability.175 One of the major problems with the Guidelines
is that defendants whose conduct caused the same harm are
given similar sentences even though they may differ greatly
in culpability.176 Defendants who committed the same crime
are sentenced similarly, but defendants who are of
comparable culpability are not sentenced similarly.177
As stated above, under the Guidelines, a defendant’s
sentence correlates with the harm their conduct created—
meaning the “quantity of drugs sold or bought [or] the
amount of money stolen or laundered.”178 The Guidelines
therefore allow law enforcement an opportunity to increase
a defendant’s sentence length by manipulating factors in
reverse stash-house sting operations that equate with the
relevant conduct used to calculate sentence length.179 This is
an unchecked increase in power in the hands of law
enforcement.180 There is a large possibility and a great
danger for this power to be used capriciously.181 The
mandatory minimum sentencing laws also grant law
enforcement an unchecked increase in power during sting
operations. The decisions an officer makes during the reverse
stash-house sting operation about the presence or absence of
certain attributes of the crime can determine the defendant’s
173. Id.
174. Id. The rate is slightly less than proportional.
175. Id. at 196.
176. Id. at 197.
177. Id. at 199.
178. Id. at 206.
179. Id. at 205.
180. Id. at 206.
181. Id.
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mandatory minimum sentence.
This potential for unfettered power in the hands of the
Government has not gone unnoticed by the courts. Courts
have attempted to check this power and restore some amount
of judicial control over sentencing through the entrapment
defense and the outrageous government conduct claim.182
However, the application of these defenses are very
limited.183 But, as frustration within the judiciary grew,
courts began to surmise that even if the action of the
government is “insufficiently oppressive to support an
entrapment defense . . . or due process claim,” it still may
warrant a reduction in the sentence of a defendant.184 From
this suggestion arose the claim of sentencing factor
manipulation.

182. Id. at 215.
183. Id.
184. United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992).
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III. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SENTENCING FACTOR
MANIPULATION CLAIM IN FEDERAL COURT
The term “sentencing factor manipulation” was first
coined in United States v. Connell.185 In Connell, an
undercover Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agent
approached Connell, a stockbroker, and requested he help
launder money.186 Connell complied: he accepted cash,
opened several bank accounts to spread the cash around,
withdrew cash and redeposited it, and bought stock with the
cash.187 The undercover agent told Connell the cash derived
from the illegal drug trade but Connell was not overly
inquisitive.188 On appeal, Connell argued the undercover
agent “gratuitously spun a yarn about the illicit origin of the
funds for the sole purpose of guaranteeing that [his]
punishment would be increased.”189 He labeled this
argument “sentencing entrapment” and requested a
downward departure from the Guidelines range.190
The court thought the term sentencing entrapment was
catchy but that Connell’s argument was better labeled
“sentencing manipulation.”191 Sentencing entrapment was
185. Id. at 192. “This appeal, in which the appellant complains that the
government practiced ‘sentencing entrapment,’ calls upon us to venture onto
terra incognita.” Id.
186. Id. at 193.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 194.
190. Id. It appears sentencing entrapment was first mentioned in dicta in the
Eighth Circuit:
[i]n mounting this attack, appellant relies heavily upon two cases which, while
affirming sentences imposed by district judges, mention in dicta that a creature such
as ‘sentencing entrapment’ might be roaming loose in the guidelines jungle and,
under certain unspecified circumstances, might warrant a downward departure from
the GSR. See United States v. Lenfesty, 923 F.2d 1293, 1300 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
499 U.S. 968 (1991); United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607, 614 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 967 (1991).
Id.
191. Id.
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an inappropriate and misleading term because Connell
admitted he was predisposed to structure cash transactions,
thus there was no basis for an entrapment defense.192 The
court proposed Connell’s argument was instead that “the
government practiced what might more accurately be called
‘sentencing factor manipulation.’”193 It acknowledged an
element of manipulation is natural in any sting operation
and defined the sentencing factor manipulation claim as “the
manipulation inherent in a sting operation, even if
insufficiently oppressive to support an entrapment defense,
or due process claims, [that] must sometimes be filtered out
of the sentencing calculus.”194 The court declined to “chart
the line between permissible and impermissible conduct on
the part of . . . government” but did say, “should a
sufficiently egregious case appear, the sentencing court has
ample power to . . . exclud[e] the tainted transaction from
the computation of relevant conduct.”195
Since Connell, the definition, use, application, and
recognition of the sentencing entrapment defense and the
sentencing factor manipulation claim have been massively
chaotic. The federal courts are largely divergent in their
treatment of the two claims. To say there is furious confusion
over the definition and distinction of the claims would not do
the current state of disarray justice. Therefore, the state of
the claims will be discussed circuit by circuit.
The First Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment
and sentencing factor manipulation interchangeably.196 It
recognizes both as one valid claim.197 The court has even
gone so far as to describe sentencing factor manipulation as

192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 196.
196. United States v. Kenney, 756 F.3d 36, 51 n.10 (1st Cir. 2014); United
States v. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2008).
197. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d at 57–58.
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the “kissing cousin” of sentencing entrapment.198 It has
defined the sentencing claim as when “law enforcement
agents venture outside the scope of legitimate investigation
and engage in extraordinary misconduct that improperly
enlarges of the scope or scale of the crime”199 “in order ‘to
secure a longer sentence than [it] would otherwise
obtain.’”200 If a sentencing factor manipulation claim is
brought successfully, the defendant is entitled to a sentence
below the statutory minimum.201 The court has
acknowledged the burden on the defendant is very high, as
he must prove beyond a preponderance of the evidence that
the government engaged in extraordinary misconduct.202
While the inquiry focuses primarily on the behavior of the
government, the defendant’s predisposition to commit the
charged crime is also relevant as a secondary
consideration.203
In its most recent consideration of the sentencing factor
manipulation claim in the context of an ATF reverse stashhouse sting, the First Circuit rejected the defendant’s
argument of the claim.204 The defendant argued the
government engaged in sentencing factor manipulation
because the “ATF improperly expanded the scope of the
planned robbery from $100,000 in cash . . . to $200,000 plus
five kilograms of cocaine worth up to $100,000, thereby
subjecting [the defendant] to a ten-year mandatory
minimum sentence on the drug conspiracy count.”205 Even

198. United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1994).
199. Jaca-Nazario, 521 F.3d at 58 (quoting United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d
82, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)).
200. Kenney, 756 F.3d at 51 (internal alterations) (quoting West v. United
States, 631 F.3d 563, 570 (1st Cir. 2011)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 52.
205. Id. at 49.
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though the court admitted an explanation by the government
as to why the changed terms of the robbery would have been
preferable, it still rejected the defendant’s claim based on a
vague finding of predisposition.206
The Second Circuit defines sentencing entrapment and
sentencing manipulation distinctly, but has not yet
recognized the validity of either because it has not yet been
presented with factual circumstances upon which a
defendant would prevail on either claim.207 Sentencing
entrapment is when the government has induced the
defendant to commit a crime he was otherwise not
predisposed to commit.208 It would “preclude a sentence
where ‘outrageous official conduct’ has ‘overcome[] the
[defendant’s] will.”209 Sentencing manipulation occurs “when
the government engages in improper conduct that has the
effect of increasing the defendant’s sentence.”210 It requires
“a showing of ‘outrageous’ misconduct.”211 The court has
applied the doctrines in theory but the claims have never
been successful.212
The Third Circuit’s approach is identical to that of the
Second—it defines sentencing entrapment and sentencing
manipulation distinctly, but has not yet adopted nor rejected
the doctrines.213 Sentencing entrapment occurs where
“official conduct leads an individual otherwise indisposed to
dealing in a larger quantity or different type of controlled

206. Id. at 51–52.
207. United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194, 226 (2d Cir. 2013).
208. United States v. Gomez, 103 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 1997).
209. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 226 (alterations in original) (quoting Gomez, 103
F.3d at 256).
210. Gomez, 103 F.3d at 256 (quoting United States v. Okey, 47 F.3d 238, 240
(7th Cir. 1995)).
211. Cromitie, 727 F.3d at 226.
212. Id. at 227; United States v. Gagliardi, 506 F.3d 140, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Bala, 236 F. 3d 87, 93 (2d Cir. 2000); Gomez, 103 F.3d at 256.
213. United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2010).
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substance to do so, and the result is a higher sentence.”214
Sentencing factor manipulation is a violation of the Due
Process Clause that “occurs when the government unfairly
exaggerates the defendant’s sentencing range by engaging in
a longer-than-needed investigation and, thus, increasing the
drug quantities for which the defendant is responsible.”215
It appears216 the Fourth Circuit follows the Second and
Third—it acknowledges the difference between the
sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation
claims217 but has declined to formally recognize either thus
far, as it has not been presented with a set of facts requiring
it to do so.218 The key element in its theoretical sentencing
entrapment claim is the predisposition of the defendant and
the key element in its theoretical sentencing manipulation
214. Id. at 230 (quoting United States v. Martin, 583 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir.
2009).
215. Id. at 231 (quoting United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir.
2009).
216. The court in United States v. Ramos, 462 F.3d 329, 335 (4th Cir. 2006)
appears to intertwine the two claims, but the majority of the cases do in fact
distinguish the claims; see supra notes 131–32 and accompanying text.
217. See United States v. Brown, 69 F. App’x 175, 177 (4th Cir. 2003). In
Brown, Brown was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
more than five kilograms of cocaine and more than fifty grams of cocaine base,
which resulted in a 135 month imprisonment sentence. Id. at 176. Brown argued
for downward departure on appeal based upon both, distinctively, sentencing
entrapment and sentencing manipulation. Id. at 177. He argued the police
engaged in sentencing entrapment because the officers demanded Brown sell
them crack cocaine when he normally sold marijuana. Id. Separately he argued
the police engaged in sentencing manipulation because they requested and two
controlled buys instead of one. Id. The court rejected the sentencing entrapment
claim because Brown “did not claim that he lacked a predisposition to committing
the drug offense,” id., and it rejected the sentencing manipulation claim because
“it is ‘not outrageous for the government to continue to purchase narcotics from
willing sellers even after a level of narcotics relevant for sentencing purposes has
been sold.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1155 (4th Cir.
1994)). See also United States v. Herndon, 232 F.3d 891 (4th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision).
218. See Herndon, 232 F.3d at 891 (“this court has declined to recognize claims
of ‘sentence entrapment’ and ‘sentence manipulation’ in similar cases and
declines to do so in this appeal”); United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d 1145 (4th Cir.
1994).
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claim is the outrageous conduct of the government.219
It is unclear if the Fifth Circuit uses the terms
sentencing entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation
interchangeably220 or if it acknowledges them as separate
claims.221 Either way, it has never recognized the claim or
claims as valid.222 Originally, the Fifth Circuit defined the
claims separately. Sentencing factor manipulation was first
defined in United States v. Tremelling,223 where the court
mirrored the claim after a similar one in United States v.
Richardson.224
Richardson centered on a reverse-sting-moneylaundering operation.225 On appeal, the defendant argued
the government, in violation of due process, brought more
money to the table in order to increase his sentence: “the
[g]overnment in its sole discretion could have put an
additional $1 million, $2 million, or $3 million dollars in front
of the gentlemen . . . which would effect the Guidelines.”226
The court did not find the government unfairly manipulated
the amount of money involved in the operation because the
defendant repeatedly asked for larger sums to launder.227
Relying on this case, the Tremelling court thus defined the
sentencing factor manipulation claim as a due process claim
focusing on the unfair, manipulative, or arbitrarily

219. See Brown, 69 F. App’x at 177.
220. See United States v. Rodriguez, 603 F. App’x 306, 321 (5th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d 181, 187 (5th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2013).
221. United States v. Robertson, 297 F. App’x 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Tremelling, 43 F.3d 148, 150–51 (5th Cir. 1995).
222. Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d at 187; Stephens, 717 F.3d at 446.
223. 43 F.3d at 150–51.
224. 925 F.2d 112, 117–18 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1237 (1991).
225. Id. at 114–15.
226. Id. at 117, 118 n.17.
227. Id. at 118.
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influential
conduct
of
government officers.228
It
distinguished sentencing claims related to entrapment from
those sentencing claims related to Justice Rehnquist’s
outrageous government conduct in Russell.229
After Tremelling, the court’s treatment of the claims
becomes blurred. Sometimes the court has treated the claims
as separate theoretical claims: “[w]e have not yet determined
whether sentencing entrapment, or the related concept of
sentencing factor manipulation, is a cognizable defense to a
sentence.”230 But other times, the court has combined the
claims into one, labeled the quasi-claim sentencing
entrapment, and combined the definitions into one: “[w]e
have never recognized sentencing entrapment as a defense
[but if we] were to accept it, it would only be cognizable in
cases involving ‘true entrapment,’ or ‘overbearing and
outrageous conduct’ on the part of the [g]overnment.”231 The
combined theoretical claim focuses on both the
predisposition or resistance of the defendant and the
contributory or encouraging behavior of the government.232
The Sixth Circuit defines sentencing entrapment and
sentencing manipulation distinctly, but has not yet
recognized the validity of either claim.233 The court defines

228. Tremelling, 43 F.3d at 151.
229. Id. at 152.
230. United States v. Robertson, 297 F. App’x 316, 317 (5th Cir. 2008).
231. United States v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2013) (citations
omitted).
232. United States v. Macedo-Flores, 788 F.3d 181, 189 (5th Cir. 2015)
(rejecting the defendant’s sentencing entrapment claim because he did not prove
“the [g]overnment induced him to sell drugs generally” nor that “the
[g]overnment induced him to sell larger quantities of drugs than what he was
already predisposed to sell.”); Stephens, 717 F.3d at 447 (“[S]ince the
[g]overnment’s conduct amounted to nothing more than passive encouragement,
and since there is no evidence that [the defendant] resisted the increase in the
targeted amount of money, we hold that [the defendant] would not be entitled to
a sentencing entrapment defense even were it available in this circuit.”).
233. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2017); United
States v. Hammadi, 737 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 2013).
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sentencing entrapment as “similar to the subjective theory of
entrapment and ‘focuses on the defendant’s lack of
predisposition to commit the greater offense.’”234 It defines
sentence factor manipulation as similar to “the objective
theory of entrapment, and ‘focuses on the [g]overnment’s
conduct.’”235 It does not recognize either claim because under
the facts it has been presented thus far, it has not needed to
decide whether to adopt or reject the doctrines.236
The Seventh Circuit acknowledges that sentencing
entrapment and sentencing factor manipulation are
different claims.237 It accepts the sentencing entrapment
claim but rejects the sentencing factor manipulation
claim.238 The court explains sentencing entrapment as “when
a defendant who lacks a predisposition to engage in more
serious crimes nevertheless does so ‘as a result of
unrelenting government persistence.’”239 It describes
sentencing factor manipulation as “distinct from entrapment
and occurs when the government ‘procures evidence
“through outrageous conduct solely for the purpose of
increasing the defendant’s sentence under the Sentencing
Guidelines.’”240 While the court firmly rejects the sentencing
factor manipulation claim, it does recognize that it “could be
relevant to a district court’s application of the [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factors” at sentencing.241 But, the court finds its
relevancy is lost when a defendant is sentenced to the
mandatory minimum.242

234. Flowers, 712 F. App’x at 504 (quoting Hammadi, 737 F.3d at 1048).
235. Id. (quoting Hammadi, 737 F.3d at 1048).
236. Hammadi, 737 F.3d at 1048.
237. United States v. Blitch, 773 F.3d 837, 848 (7th Cir. 2014).
238. Id.
239. Id. (quoting United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2009)).
240. Id. (quoting Knox, 573 F.3d at 451).
241. Knox, 573 F.3d at 452.
242. Blitch, 773 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Wilson, 129 F.3d 949, 951
(7th Cir. 1997)) (a district court may not use the doctrine of sentencing
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The Eighth Circuit too considers sentencing entrapment
and sentencing manipulation to be separate and distinct
claims.243 Sentencing entrapment is where “an individual,
‘predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is
entrapped in[to] committing a greater offense subject to
greater punishment.’”244 The locus of the inquiry when
considering the claim is the defendant’s predisposition.245
Conversely, sentencing manipulation “focuses on ‘whether
the government stretched out the investigation merely to
increase [the defendant’s sentence].’”246 It is the defendant’s
burden to prove the government engaged in conduct solely to
enhance
the
defendant’s
sentence.247
Sentencing
manipulation is a violation of the Due Process Clause.248 If
the court makes a finding of sentencing manipulation, “it
should grant a downward departure to the Guidelines range
it believes would apply absent the manipulation, since such
manipulation artificially inflates the offense level.”249 The
court accepts both claims as valid defenses available to a
defendant.250
manipulation to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum).
243. United States v. Booker, 639 F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 565
U.S. 1043 (2011).
244. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Stuart, 923 F.2d 607,
613 (8th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d 762, 774–75 (8th Cir.
2006) (“Sentencing entrapment occurs when official [government] conduct leads
a defendant predisposed to deal only in small quantities of drugs to deal in larger
quantities, leading to an increased sentence.”) (alterations in original) (quoting
United States v. Searcy, 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 2000)).
245. United States v. Martin, 583 F.3d 1068, 1073 (8th Cir. 2009).
246. Booker, 639 F.3d at 1118 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Shephard, 4 F.3d 647, 649 (8th Cir. 1993)); see also United States v. Torres, 563
F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Sentencing manipulation occurs when the
government unfairly exaggerates the defendant’s sentencing range by engaging
in a longer-than-needed investigation and, thus, increasing the drug quantities
for which the defendant is responsible.”).
247. United States v. Sacus, 784 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir. 2015).
248. Torres, 563 F.3d at 734.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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The Ninth Circuit likewise distinguishes between the
sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation
claims.251 The former addresses the defendant’s
predisposition and the latter addresses the conduct of law
enforcement.252 Sentencing entrapment is found where “a
defendant can show he was predisposed to commit a minor
or lesser offense, but was entrapped [in committing] a
greater offense, subject to greater punishment.”253
Distinctly, sentencing manipulation results when “the
government increases a defendant’s guideline sentence by
conducting a lengthy investigation which increases the
number of drug transactions and quantities for which the
defendant is responsible.”254 They key difference between the
claims is that for sentencing manipulation, “the judicial gaze
should . . . focus primarily . . . on the government’s conduct
and motives.”255
The Ninth Circuit defines sentencing manipulation as a
due process based claim.256 The defendant must show the
government engaged in behavior solely to enhance his
potential sentence.257 Relief is granted in only extreme cases
involving outrageous government conduct.258 If sentencing
manipulation is found, the court should grant the defendant
a downward departure to the guidelines range because such
manipulation artificially inflates the offense level.259 The
Ninth Circuit recognizes both claims as valid but has yet to
251. United States v. Boykin, 785 F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 2015) (The
court acknowledged its “lack of precision with which [it had] previously used the
terms ‘sentencing entrapment’ and ‘sentencing manipulation’” and clarified that
they are distinct.).
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1360.
254. Id.
255. Id. (quoting United States v. Fontes 415 F.3d 174, 181–82 (1st Cir. 2005)).
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1361.
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find a set of facts where either apply.260
The Tenth Circuit uses the terms sentencing entrapment
and sentencing factor manipulation interchangeably.261 It
recognizes both as one valid claim to be analyzed under the
due process principle of outrageous government conduct.262
The court is allowed to grant the defendant a downward
departure if the government’s conduct is so shocking,
intolerable, and outrageous that it has offended the
universal sense of justice.263 Because the burden on the
defendant is so high, the defendant’s claim of sentencing
entrapment or sentencing factor manipulation “may also be
considered as request for a variance from the applicable
guideline range under the § 3553(a) factors.”264
The Eleventh Circuit defines sentencing entrapment and
sentencing manipulation as separate and distinct
defenses.265 “While sentencing entrapment focuses on the
defendant’s predisposition, sentencing factor manipulation
focuses on the government’s conduct.”266 Sentencing
entrapment occurs when a defendant, predisposed to commit
a lesser crime, is entrapped into committing a greater crime
and thus subjected to a greater punishment.267 The circuit
has outright rejected sentencing entrapment as a viable

260. Id. at 1360–63. (The court applied the defendant’s sentencing
manipulation claim but did not find the government’s conduct outrageous enough
to meet the requirement for relief.).
261. United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (10th Cir. 2009).
262. Id. at 1018.
263. Id.; see also United States v. Martinez, 482 F. App’x 315, 317 (10th Cir.
2012) (giving an example of the type of conduct that would meet the
outrageousness standard and warrant a departure: “heavily pressuring the
defendant during a sting operation to deal a higher volume of drugs than he
otherwise would”).
264. Beltran, 571 F.3d at 1019.
265. United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998).
266. Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted).
267. Id.
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defense.268
However, it does recognize the validity of the sentencing
factor manipulation claim.269 The circuit recognizes the due
process based claim of outrageous government conduct and
consequently, recognizes sentencing factor manipulation as
a defense interrelated to the outrageous government conduct
defense.270 Sentencing factor manipulation occurs when “the
government’s manipulation of a sting operation, even if
insufficient to support [an entrapment defense] or due
process claim, requires that the manipulation be filtered out
of the sentencing calculus.”271 The claim specifically involves
“the opportunities that the sentencing guidelines pose for
prosecutors to gerrymander the district court’s sentencing
options and thus, defendant’s sentences.”272 If successful, a
claim of outrageous government conduct would reverse a
defendant’s conviction, while a successful claim of sentencing
factor manipulation would simply reduce the sentence.273
Finally, the D.C. Circuit recognizes both sentencing
entrapment and sentencing manipulation and distinguishes
between the two.274 Sentencing entrapment “occurs ‘if the
government induces a defendant to commit a more serious
crime when he was predisposed to commit a less serious
offense.’”275 In slight contrast, sentencing manipulation

268. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007);
Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414.
269. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270.
270. Id.; Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The Eleventh Circuit recognizes the
outrageous government conduct defense, which focuses on “the tactics employed
by law enforcement officials to obtain a conviction for conduct beyond the
defendant’s predisposition.” Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1413. The inquiry “is whether
the methods comport with the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process.” Id.
271. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270; see also Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414.
272. Sanchez, 138 F.3d at 1414 (quoting United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d
191, 194 (1st Cir. 1992)).
273. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d at 1270.
274. United States v. Mack, 841 F.3d 514, 523–24 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
275. Id. at 523 (quoting United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329 (D.C. Cir.
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“occurs ‘when the government unfairly exaggerates the
defendant’s sentencing range by engaging in a longer-thanneeded investigation and, thus, increas[es] the drug
quantities for which the defendant is responsible.’”276 The
court illustrated the difference between the two claims in
United States v. Hopkins.277
Hopkins and his co-conspirators were ensnared in a
reverse sting operation: an undercover law enforcement
officer proposed Hopkins and his co-conspirators rob a liquor
store.278 Undercover officers met several times with Hopkins
to discuss the details of the planned robbery.279 At the final
meeting, an undercover officer handed Hopkins and each of
his co-conspirators a gun.280 Shortly thereafter, Hopkins and
his co-conspirators were arrested.281 In affirming the district
court’s order, the D.C. Circuit Court found the district court
“clearly understood the difference between sentencing
entrapment and sentencing manipulation.”282 Hopkins’
sentencing entrapment claim was correctly rejected as he
“was perfectly comfortable with the idea of using weapons”
and predisposed to commit the crime.283
However, the district court properly credited Hopkins’
sentencing manipulation claim because the undercover
agents brought and provided the weapons, weapons which
the co-conspirators were likely incapable of supplying
themselves.284 Thus the government’s conduct constituted
1995)).
276. Id. (quoting United States v. Torres, 563 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 2009)).
277. 715 F. App’x 20 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (per curiam), aff’g United States v.
McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
278. McKeever, 824 F.3d at 1116, aff’d sub nom. Hopkins, 715 F. App’x 20.
279. Id. at 1118.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Hopkins, 715 F. App’x at 21, aff’g McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113.
283. Id. at 22.
284. Id.
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sentencing manipulation. If the district court had found
sentencing entrapment, it would have been required to
sentence Hopkins without the five-level Guidelines
enhancement for possessing or brandishing a firearm during
a robbery.285 Whereas because the district court had found
sentencing manipulation, it correctly factored the
manipulation out of the sentencing calculus and sentenced
him as if his Guidelines range had been enhanced by three
levels rather than five.286
IV. ANALYSIS
Courts have long recognized that law enforcement
officers “must be given leeway to probe the depth and extent
of a criminal enterprise, to determine whether coconspirators exist, and to trace the drug deeper into the
distribution hierarchy.”287 Undercover operations and
undercover agents serve an important purpose in the
investigation of crime and “courts should go very slowly
before staking out rules that will deter government agents
from the proper performance of their investigative duties.”288
However, this is neither the case nor the purpose of the
continued law enforcement conduct and manipulation
prevalent in reverse stash-house sting operations.289 A claim

285. Id. at 21.
286. Id.
287. United States v. Baber, 161 F.3d 531, 532 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting United
States v. Calva, 979 F.2d 119, 123 (8th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Barth,
990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir.1993) (“[C]ourts should go very slowly before staking
out rules that will deter government agents from the proper performance of their
investigative duties.”) (quoting United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st
Cir. 1992)); Calva, 979 F.2d at 123.
288. Connell, 960 F.2d at 196; see also ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791.
289. Reverse stash-house stings are not instances of the government
“combating crime too energetically.” Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952). And the government is not excused by the legitimacy and public policy
purposes underlying typical sting cases—”[d]isinterested zeal for the public good
does not assure either wisdom or right it the methods it pursues.” Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 605 (1948). After conducting an evaluation of cases, one court found
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of sentencing factor manipulation would be especially
applicable in these cases.
A. Sentencing Factor Manipulation as it Relates to ATF
Reverse Stash-House Sting Operations
The structure of reverse stash-house sting operations is
highly problematic.290 The freedom the government is
allowed in charging offenses stemming from ATF reverse
stash-house sting operations has created a “terrifying
capacity for escalation of a defendant’s sentence.”291 Bluntly
put, “sentencing discretion is delegated all the way down to
the individual drug agent operating in the field.”292 “[A] stash
house sting operation is the ‘perfect’ crime, at least from the
standpoint of the prosecution, in that it predetermines both
verdict and sentence.”293 This is because during a reverse
stash-house sting operation, the ATF has the unbridled
ability to choose the quantity of drugs, the type of drugs, and
the obstacles the individual must overcome to obtain the
drugs.
Under the Guidelines, the sentence for a particular drug
crime is tied to the drug quantity.294 The quantity of drugs
supposedly reflects the defendant’s position in the drug
hierarchy.295 However, in cases like these, where the
government controls the quantity of drug, rather than the
defendant, the predicted correlation between the quantity of

a “constitutionally unacceptable” number of cases where the “crime [was]
fabricated entirely by the police to secure the defendant’s conviction rather than
to protect the public from the defendant’s continuing criminal behavior.” United
States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986).
290. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 935 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
291. Barth, 990 F.2d at 424 (quoting United States v. Barth, 788 F. Supp. 1055,
1057 (D. Minn. 1992)).
292. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994).
293. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 939.
294. Id. at 928.
295. Id. at 929.
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drug and the defendant’s culpability is disrupted. 296 The
defendant may not have been entrapped in the traditional
sense because he was willing to participate in the illegal
activity proposed by the government, but that defendant also
might have never had the capability, capacity, or inclination
to deal drugs in the minimum-triggering quantity selected
by the government.297
The Sentencing Commission “is aware of the unfairness
and arbitrariness of allowing drug enforcement agents to put
unwarranted pressure on a defendant in order to increase his
or her sentence without regard for his predisposition, his
capacity to commit the crime on his own, and the extent of
his culpability.”298 The Guidelines identify the danger
inherent in the government’s ability to choose and then
charge the quantity of drug.299 In limited circumstances, the
Guidelines attempt to correct this danger by allowing judges
to compensate for the government’s abuse of discretion.300
Reverse stash-house sting operations give rise “to
particularly dubious applications of the . . . Guidelines and
mandatory minimum sentences.”301 The government sets the
amount of drugs at a level that substantially increases
sentencing exposure. “[S]entences should bear some rational
relationship to culpability.”302 Often times, there is no
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 929.
299. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 929.
300. Id. For example, if the government sets a below-market price for an
undercover illegal drug purchase and the defendant therefore purchases a large
quantity of drugs in the set-up transaction, the judge can depart downward. Id.
But, this “downward departure when the government artificially lowers the price
of the drugs . . . only addresses one of the ways in which drug enforcement agents
are able to manipulate sentences.” Staufer, 38 F.3d at 1107; see also McLean, 199
F. Supp. 3d at 929.
301. United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 226 (3d Cir. 2017) (McKee, J.,
dissenting).
302. Id.
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evidence to suggest the defendant would not have conspired
to rob a stash-house containing some amount less than the
five-kilogram mandatory trigger.303 If five-kilograms
translates to a street value of approximately $200,000, who
is to say that an impoverished defendant would not have
agreed to rob the fictitious stash-house containing fourkilograms of cocaine with a street value of $160,000?304 The
government never answers this question and extremely few
reverse stash-house sting operations have employed a
fictional amount of cocaine less than the five-kilograms that
triggers the mandatory minimum sentences.305
Furthermore, the defendant is not always inclined to
deal in the type of drug (cocaine) that the government
suggests. Cocaine, the government’s drug of choice, is
classified as a narcotic that requires harsher sentences.
Cocaine lends itself to the reverse stash-house sting ploy.
Quite simply, a large amount of cocaine can be stored in a
house. Whereas in dealing with a large amount of another
drug, for example marijuana, the house would not be a stashhouse, it would be a grow-house, or in the case of other drugs,
some kind of production center. The government defends the
quantity and type of drug chosen as necessary to protect its
officers.306 It argues the operation needs to be realistic. Not
only is this rationale incapable of any meaningful validation
but it is troublesome because the tactical concerns of law
enforcement should not be allowed to control the severity of
charges or the sentencing range and the defendant has little
to no opportunity to challenge the government’s reasoning.307
In sum, the sentencing factor manipulation claim would
be obviously applicable to reverse stash-house sting
operations because of the very nature of the operations. The
303. Id.
304. See id.
305. Id.
306. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 935 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
307. Id. at 928–35.
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ploy, scripted by the government alone, gives “the
government [the] virtually unfettered ability to inflate the
amount of drugs . . . thereby obtain[ing] a greater sentence
for the defendant.”308 It is the government that chooses the
quantity of drug to be robbed, the type of drug to be robbed,
and the obstacles a target must overcome during the robbery.
These elements correlate exactly to the defendant’s sentence
length. Therefore, the discretion the government has to
manipulate these elements allows it full control over the
amount of time the defendants spend in prison.309 The
sentencing factor manipulation claim would allow removal of
these elements or factors chosen by the government from the
sentencing calculus.
B. Proposal
The solution is simple. At trial, an entrapment defense
is available to a defendant in a reverse stash-house sting
case, but likely will be unsuccessful.310 Alternatively, where
recognized, a defendant may bring an outrageous
government conduct claim, but also will likely be
unsuccessful. At sentencing, where recognized, a defendant
may raise a sentencing entrapment defense or claim
sentencing factor manipulation. Sentencing entrapment and
sentencing factor manipulation are two separate and distinct
claims—the former stems from the subjective theory of
entrapment and the latter stems from the objective theory of
entrapment. For cases involving reverse stash-house sting
operations, sentencing entrapment is an inappropriate
defense and will likely be unsuccessful. Therefore, the
308. United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010).
309. United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 509 (6th Cir. 2017) (Stranch,
J., dissenting).
310. Entrapment is usually unsuccessful in reverse stash-house sting cases
because the defendant must show inducement and lack of predisposition. The
defendant can rarely prove inducement because defendant’s are often eager to
engage in the robbery plot due to the fictional high pay-off created by the
government.
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solution would be universal recognition of a sentencing factor
manipulation claim.
1. Entrapment
Distinguished

and

Sentencing

Entrapment

A claim of sentencing entrapment is not appropriate in
reverse stash-house sting cases and when evaluating a
sentencing factor manipulation claim, it likewise is
irrelevant whether or not the defendant raised or prevailed
upon an entrapment defense at trial.311
a. Entrapment
Entrapment was adopted as a defense by the Supreme
Court in Sorrells as a matter of statutory construction.312 The
Court reasoned that in enacting the criminal prohibition at
issue, Congress could not have intended “to permit law
enforcement officers to instigate criminal acts by otherwise
innocent people and then to punish them for such acts.”313
Notably, entrapment, “rather than any constitutional
prohibition, represents the principal legal restriction on the
way in which undercover investigations are conducted.” 314
However, the federal courts employ the subjective test for
entrapment—focusing on whether the defendant was
predisposed to commit the crime at issue and affording a
defense to a defendant who commits a crime pursuant to
government inducement but who can show he was otherwise
not predisposed in that direction.315
311. A defendant has every right to bring an entrapment defense in the case of
a reverse stash-house sting, but the success of his entrapment defense will be of
no consequence to his claim of sentencing factor manipulation. Even if he falls
short of proving entrapment, he may still be successful on proving sentencing
factor manipulation. See United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2007).
312. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791.
313. Id.; see Sorells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932).
314. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791.
315. Id. The defendant may demonstrate lack of predisposition in response to
the government’s demonstration of predisposition.

2019]

REVERSE STASH-HOUSE STINGS

499

In cases involving reverse stash-house stings,316 an
entrapment defense is unlikely to be successful because the
defendant cannot show sufficient inducement and lack of
predisposition—even if he can prove one part, he cannot
prove the other.317 Universally, entrapment is rarely, if ever,
brought as a successful defense.318 As the Supreme Court
explained when it first considered entrapment in Sorrells,
entrapment occurs “when the criminal design originates with
the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind
of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged
offense.”319 The line is between “an unwary innocent” and “an
unwary criminal”320—an innocent with no predisposition
versus a criminal predisposed.
Illustrative is the case of United States v. McLean.321 In

316. I would argue entrapment has occurred in the vast majority of reverse
stash-house sting operations. By authoring the fictional robbery plot from start
to finish, I find that the “criminal design originate[d], not with the accused, but
[was] conceived in the mind of the government officers,” Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 445;
the “commission [was] by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery,” id. at 454; “the actual creation of [the] crime [was] by those whose duty
[it was] to deter its commission,” id.; and the government was not only the
instigator of the crime but the sole responsible “creative brain behind the illegal
scheme.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 439 (1973). Regarding
predisposition, I do not believe a defendant with minor drug convictions is
predisposed to commit a large scale stash-house robbery using weapons and I do
not find that his eagerness for a large pay-day demonstrates such predisposition.
317. Reverse stash-house sting cases also present a unique obstacle regarding
an entrapment defense: sometimes the defendant in the case was not the target
of the ATF and therefore can’t use entrapment as a defense. United States v.
Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492 (6th Cir. 2017) is an example of a case with a defendant
facing this scenario. Mr. Flowers was not contacted by the ATF and not brought
into the robbery plot by the ATF. Id. at 497. The target of the ATF’s plot,
Alexander, recruited Mr. Flowers. Id. Thus, Mr. Flowers could not claim the ATF
entrapped him. There are different strings of entrapment defenses available to
these defendants, such as derivative entrapment, United States v. Conley, 875
F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017), and indirect entrapment, United States v. Valencia, 645
F.2d 1158, 1168–72 (2d Cir. 1980), but those defenses are rarely successful.
318. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 78, at 791.
319. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442.
320. Russell, 411 U.S. at 429.
321. 702 F. App’x 81 (3d Cir. 2017).
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McLean, a paid confidential informant for the ATF recruited
Clifton McLean to participate in a reverse stash-house sting
operation.322 After meeting several times with the informant,
McLean met with the ATF agent (posing as a drug courier)
who described the robbery: the stash house would contain “at
least eight or nine bricks of cocaine” and there would be at
least three armed guards inside the house.323 The agent
described the layout of the fictional house and described how
the drugs and money would be divided.324 McLean expressed
his interest in the robbery and assembled a team.325 Five
days before the planned robbery, McLean, his coconspirators, the ATF agent, and the informant met to plot
the robbery in detail—McLean again expressed his interest
in going through with the plan.326 On the day of the planned
robbery, the group met at a junkyard where McLean and his
co-conspirators were arrested.327
At trial, McLean requested the jury be instructed on
entrapment, however, the district court denied his request
and the circuit court found no error.328 The Third Circuit
stated “[e]ntrapment is a ‘relatively limited defense’” 329 and
“in order to obtain the instruction, the defendant must show
that (1) he was induced by the Government to commit a crime
which (2) he was not predisposed to commit.”330 Defined,
“[i]nducement is more than ‘mere solicitation’ to partake in a
crime” and predisposition is “the defendant’s inclination to

322. Id. at 82–83.
323. Id. at 83.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 83–84.
327. Id. at 84.
328. Id. at 84–85, 86.
329. Id. at 85 (quoting United States v. Lakhani, 480 F.3d 171, 179 (3d Cir.
2007)).
330. Id.
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engage in the crime for which he was charged.”331 The Third
Circuit found McLean could not show either inducement or
lack of predisposition.332 The evidence was insufficient to
demonstrate inducement because “the Government merely
offered McLean the criminal opportunity and . . . McLean
willingly accepted.”333 He did not face “persuasion,
fraudulent representation, threats, coercive tactics,
harassment, [or] promises of reward or pleas based on need,
sympathy, or friendship.”334 As to predisposition, the court
found that even though McLean lacked any relevant criminal
history, the fact that he was easily enticed by the ATF,
showed enthusiasm for the plot, and never backed out
evidenced his predisposition to the criminal conduct at
issue.335 Thus, entrapment was not available to McLean as a
defense.336
McLean illustrates why an entrapment defense is rarely
successful in reverse stash-house sting cases: if the
defendant does not hesitate to join the plot, exhibits a
receptiveness to the plot, does not indicate reluctance to
engage in the plot, or exhibits a readiness to participate in
the plot, predisposition has been shown and the defense is
unavailable.337 Predisposition will always be the barrier to
the entrapment defense in reverse stash-house sting cases
because of the nature of the criminal activity proposed by the
ATF—a large scale drug robbery results in a high pay-off,

331. Id. (quoting United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990)).
332. Id. at 86.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 85 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Fedroff, 874
F.2d 178, 184 (3d Cir. 1989).
335. Id. at 86.
336. Id. But see United States v. Dennis, 826 F.3d 683, 690–94 (3d Cir. 2016)
(finding the defendant’s criminal record demonstrated a predisposition to commit
drug offenses but did not demonstrate a predisposition to commit robbery and
firearm offenses).
337. See McLean, 702 F. App’x at 86; United States v. Wright, 921 F.2d 42, 46
(3d Cir. 1990).
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usually near $500,000, and this exorbitant pay-off draws an
eagerness, readiness, and willingness to participate by the
targets identified by the ATF who are of low socio-economic
status.338
b. Sentencing Entrapment
Sentencing entrapment derives from the subjective
theory of entrapment. A sentencing entrapment defense is
successful where a defendant can show he was predisposed
to commit a lesser offense, but was entrapped in committing
a greater offense, subject to a greater sentence.339 It focuses
on the defendant’s lack of predisposition to commit the
“enlarged” crime created by the government.340 In the case of
a reverse stash-house sting, the defendant must argue the
government led him to deal in a larger quantity or different
type of drug than he was otherwise predisposed to.341

338. Predisposition is a controversial component of entrapment and ill-defined.
Predisposition is assumed to be based on something “real”—criminal record,
character, state of mind, past acts, etc., but the facts of McLean show this
assumption to be incorrect. McLean had no relevant criminal record, yet the court
found him to be predisposed to the robbery because he was eager to engage. See
McLean, 702 F. App’x at 86. I presume McLean was eager to engage because of
the reward: the street value of nine bricks of cocaine. A high pay-off like this
heavily blurs the line of predisposition:
We assume that there are a few people who would not commit any
criminal acts no matter what the . . . enticement . . . . Everyone else, we
assume, has a price. That price may be quite high, for example because
a person puts a high value on her good name, but it exists. If this
assumption is true, then everyone except saints is predisposed to commit
crimes. But, that in turn means that “predisposition” cannot usefully
distinguish anyone from anyone else.
Ronald J. Allen et al., Clarifying Entrapment, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 407,
413 (1999).
339. United States v. Boykin, 785 F.3d 1352, 1360 (9th Cir. 2015). Sentencing
entrapment occurs when “a defendant who lacks a predisposition to engage in
more serious crimes nevertheless does so” at the insistence of the government.
United States v. Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 451 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States
v. Veazey, 491 F.3d 700, 710 (7th Cir. 2007)).
340. See United States v. Flowers, 712 F. App’x 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2017).
341. See United States v. Sed, 601 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2010). Or where
weapons are used, the defendant would have to show he was not predisposed to
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The key distinction between entrapment and sentencing
entrapment is that “traditional entrapment is an affirmative
defense to the substantive crime, [whereas] sentencing
entrapment is merely a defense to the sentence.”342 As such,
unlike in the case of entrapment, where the defendant must
show he was not predisposed to commit the criminal act, in
the case of sentencing entrapment, the defendant must show
he was not predisposed to commit such a degree of the
criminal act.343 But, like with the entrapment defense, the
key element in a sentencing entrapment defense is the
predisposition of the defendant and the line remains between
an “unwary innocent” and an “unwary criminal.”344
Consequently, sentencing entrapment is just as unsuccessful
as entrapment, and arguably more difficult to prove.
In United States v. Black, the defendants sought a
sentencing entrapment defense.345 The Ninth Circuit
recognized the defense as viable, and defined sentencing
entrapment to occur “when a defendant is predisposed to
commit a lesser crime, but is entrapped by the government
into committing a crime subject to more severe
punishment.”346 The court clearly articulated that “[i]n the
using weapons in the commission of offenses or was not predisposed to use that
magnitude of weapon.
342. Jess D. Mekeel, Misnamed, Misapplied, and Misguided: Clarifying the
State of Sentencing Entrapment and Proposing a New Conception of the Doctrine,
14 WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 1583, 1586 (2006).
343. Proving “degree” results in an evidentiary nightmare:
Courts would be left to decide issues such as whether a defendant only meant to
purchase five grams of cocaine for his own use as opposed to a trafficking amount
of cocaine that he actually purchased. Courts would be forced to inquire into the
quantities and types of drugs and the frequency in which defendants dealt in the
past.
Id. at 1607–08.
344. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973).
345. 733 F.3d 294, 310 (9th Cir. 2013). In Black, the defendants were recruited
by an ATF informant to carry out an armed robbery of a fictional cocaine stash
house. Id. at 297–98. Criminal histories for three of the defendants showed no
prior convictions for robbery or drug trafficking. Id. at 312.
346. Id. at 310 (quoting United States v. Mejia, 559 F.3d 1113, 1118 (9th Cir.
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context of a fictional drug stash house robbery, a defendant
can show sentencing entrapment by demonstrating that he
lacked predisposition—either through a lack of intent or a
lack of capability—to conspire with others to take by force
the amount of cocaine charged.”347 However, the court then
demonstrated the problem with a sentencing entrapment
claim in the context of reverse stash-house stings: “none of
the defendants met his burden of proving lack of
predisposition.”348 The defendants
showed no reluctance about participating in the crime, the
government did not induce the defendants’ participation in the
fictitious robbery but simply presented the opportunity to them, and
the defendants jumped at the opportunity to rob a stash house
supposedly containing 23 or more kilograms of cocaine for purposes
of making a profit.349

Just as with entrapment, proving predisposition is a bar
to bringing a sentencing entrapment defense in reverse
stash-house sting cases. Furthermore, and unlike
entrapment, a sentencing entrapment defense is wholly
inappropriate because of the predisposition component. A
sentencing entrapment defense is brought at sentencing—
the defendant asks the court to reduce the sentence because
he was entrapped to commit a larger offense with a larger
sentence than he was predisposed to. However, proving
degree of predisposition further blurs the already blurred
lines of predisposition by erasing the notion of “an innocent
person.”350 Entrapment was meant to distinguish between
the “innocent” and the “criminal,” but sentencing
entrapment seems to try to distinguish between the “guilty
criminal” and the “guiltier criminal.”
At sentencing, the defendant has already admitted guilt,
2009)).
347. Id. at 311.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 312.
350. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932).
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and
the analogy at sentencing to ordinary entrapment is not going to
help a defendant who is arguing only about the number or size of
the transactions[—h]aving crossed the reasonably bright line
between guilt and innocence, such a defendant’s criminal
inclination has already been established, and the extent of the crime
is more likely to be a matter of opportunity than of scruple.”351

Thus the focus on innocence is lost and the notion of
predisposition is misplaced in sentencing entrapment
defenses, making them an inappropriate defense in the
context of reverse stash-house stings.
2. Outrageous Government Conduct
In circuits recognizing a claim of outrageous government
conduct, the claim survives in theory but is highly
circumscribed because the standard for outrageousness is so
high.352 Unlike entrapment, which is rooted in statutory
construction, the outrageous government conduct claim is
rooted in due process principles.353 Theoretically,
“governmental misconduct may be so outrageous that it
requires dismissal of charges against a defendant under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”354 To violate
due process, the “‘government’s conduct must be so
outrageous as to shock the conscience of the court’ or be
‘offensive to traditional notions of fundamental fairness.’”355
The standard for outrageousness is extremely high. So high
in fact that it is not practical to rely on the claim in order to
combat the unfettered governmental power prevalent in

351. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995).
352. See supra notes 123–59 and accompanying text.
353. “Outrageous government conduct occurs when the actions of law
enforcement officers or informants are ‘so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain
a conviction.’” Black, 733 F.3d at 302 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423, 431–32 (1973)).
354. United States v. Thorne, 661 F. App’x 791, 792 (4th Cir. 2016).
355. Id. (quoting United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 36, 37 (4th Cir. 1991)).
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reverse stash-house stings. Courts recognize the blatant
misbehavior of the government, but because variations of the
law enforcement tactics used in reverse stash-house stings
have been recognized as reasonable in the past, they have
difficulty finding the government’s misbehavior has met the
outrageousness standard.356
For example, in Black, the defendants argued an
outrageous government conduct claim and while the court
found “troubling aspects about [the] fictional sting and how
it came about,”357 ultimately, “the government did not cross
the line” of outrageousness.358 In the opinion of the court,
circumstances nearing the line of outrageousness included:
(1) the crimes of conviction “resulted from an operation
created and staged by the ATF”;359 (2) the “evidence against
the defendants consisted of words used at meetings” between
the defendants, ATF agent, and informant;360 (3) the ATF
agent “invented the scenario, including the need for
weapons[, the need] for a crew, and the amount of cocaine
involved”;361 (4) the defendants only overt actions were a
response “to the government’s script”;362 (5) in recruiting the
defendants, the ATF “was not infiltrating a suspected crew
of home invasion robbers, or seducing persons known to have
actually engaged in such criminal behavior,” it was rather
“trolling for targets”;363 (6) the informant “provocatively cast
his bait in places defined only by economic and social
conditions;”364 and most notably (7) the government created
“a criminal enterprise that would not have come into being
356. Black, 733 F.3d at 302.
357. Id. at 302.
358. Id. at 310.
359. Id. at 302–03.
360. Id. at 303.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
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but for the temptation of a big payday, a work of fiction spun
out by government agents to persons vulnerable to such a
ploy who would not otherwise have thought of doing such a
robbery.”365
Yet, the court’s concerns were “mitigated to a large
degree”366 because: (1) the defendants told the ATF agent
they had participated in criminal activity in the past;367 (2)
the defendant bragged about committing prior criminal
offenses using drugs or guns;368 (3) the defendants responded
to the ploy with enthusiasm and were eager to commit the
fictional stash-house robbery;369 (4) there was little evidence
of coercion or pressure;370 and (5) the government did not
provide any weapons, manpower, plans, or direction on how
to perform the stash-house robbery.371 The court
acknowledged the difficulty in discerning the line between
law enforcement conduct that is acceptable and “that which
goes a fraction too far”372 and found that the government’s
conduct was not “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to
violate the universal sense of justice.”373 Thus Black
demonstrates why defendants who bring outrageous
government conduct claims are almost always unsuccessful.
3. Sentencing Factor Manipulation
Defendants in reverse stash-house sting cases are then
left with the possibility of claiming sentencing factor

365. Id.
366. Id. at 307.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 308.
371. Id. at 309.
372. Id. at 310 (quoting United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir.
1986)).
373. Id. (quoting United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011)).
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manipulation374—this is the most viable claim in reverse
stash-house sting cases, however the current formulation of
the claim requires modification in order to be a successful
check on the unbridled power of the government. Sentencing
factor manipulation should be defined as “when the
government ‘improperly enlarge[s] the scope or scale of [a]
crime’ to secure a longer sentence than [it] would otherwise
obtain.”375 It is when “the government’s manipulation of a
sting operation, even if insufficient to support [an
entrapment defense or] a due process claim, requires that the
manipulation be filtered out of the sentencing calculus.”376 It
should be a type of due process claim that focuses on the
conduct of the government and not the predisposition of the
defendant.377 Under the modified claim, the conduct of the
government offends due process when it arbitrarily
interferes with the defendant’s liberty interests.378 If
successfully brought, the conduct or manipulation of the
government that arbitrarily inflated the defendant’s
sentence should be filtered out of the sentencing calculus
before mandatory minimums are applied.379
As it stems from the objective theory of entrapment and

374. Other disciplines have proposed solutions to address the injustices
inherent in reverse stash-house sting cases. For an example, see SensenbrennerScott SAFE Justice Reinvestment Act, H.R. 2944, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. (2015).
375. United States v. DePierre, 599 F.3d 25, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting
United States v. Vasco, 564 F.3d 12, 24 (1st Cir. 2009)).
376. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007).
377. Unlike in United States v. Kenny, 756 F.3d 36, 49–52 (1st Cir. 2014),
predisposition should not be a secondary consideration that can deny relief to the
defendant where the court has already found sentencing factor manipulation.
378. Due process based claims often create evaluation issues for law
enforcement—how much is too much, how far is too far. But “under a rubric of
sentencing [factor] manipulation . . . officers [can] know that every time they
engage in certain prohibited investigatory conduct, their conduct will be found
outrageous by a court and the sentence they attempted to manipulate will in fact
be decreased by the court.” Mekeel, supra note 342, at 1616.
379. The defendant bears the initial burden of establishing sentencing factor
manipulation. A judge’s determination is a highly factbound determination and
subject to clear error review on appeal.
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the outrageous government conduct claim, sentencing factor
manipulation should be viewed as a type of due process
claim.380 “The touchstone of due process is protection of the
individual
against
[the]
arbitrary
action
of
381
government . . . .” The Supreme Court has opined that,
The phrase [due process of law] formulates a concept less rigid and
more fluid than those envisaged in other specific and particular
provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its application is less a matter of
rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality
of facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a
denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of
justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the light of other
considerations, fall short of such denial. 382

The concept of substantive due process is fluid—it not
only is intended to prevent governmental conduct that
“shocks the conscience”383 but it also protects against
governmental conduct that is “arbitrary.”384 It is a buffer
against the abuse of government power.385 In its whole, due
process preserves the “rights ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty.’”386 “To the extent that principles of Due
Process are meant to be a check on government power, there
is no more fundamental interest than liberty.”387
In reverse stash-house sting operations, there is a
“highly particularized and potentially dangerous form of
380. See generally United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973);
United States v. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, 378 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring);
United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294 (9th Cir. 2013).
381. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974).
382. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 850 (1998) (quoting Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942)).
383. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952).
384. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992).
385. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 186 (1989).
386. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746(1987) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325–26 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
387. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 943 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
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governmental power, law enforcement activity that defines
both the contours of a crime and the punishment for that
crime.”388 The manifestation of that power allows the
government to not only create a test for a defendant 389 but
also create the penalties for failing that test in advance.390
The penalty for failing the government’s test is a lengthy
prison sentence. That lengthy prison sentence is a direct
interference with one of defendant’s liberty interests:
freedom. Therefore, due process is the appropriate basis to
protect such an interest and the appropriate basis for
sentencing factor manipulation claims.391
Manipulation by the government is inherent in any sting
operation, but reverse stash-house stings turn the typical
sting on its head.392 The government alone has the ability to
control the very factors that determine how long the
defendant will spend in prison: “[d]rug agents can decide [the
quantity of drug stored in the fictional stash-house, and] if
the defendant bites at the bait, then that amount chosen by
the drug agent will determine his drug sentence.”393 Not only
can the government dictate the quantity of drug, but it can
dictate other factors that determine sentence length, like the
type of drug or the need for weapons. This custom design of
both the crime and punishment in reverse stash-house sting
operations constitutes an interference with substantial due

388. Id. at 942. The concentration of power that allows the government to
define both crime and punishment does “more than offend some fastidious
squeamishness or private sentimentalism,” it rises to an interference with due
process. Rochin, 342 US at 172.
389. “[T]he Government seeks out its citizens for the purpose of testing their
willingness to commit a criminal act.” McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d at 942.
390. Id. at 943.
391. The defendant is admitting his guilt but the government’s conduct has
resulted in a lengthened prison sentence, thereby violating the defendant’s due
process rights.
392. The danger of manipulation seems especially great where the defendant’s
sentence depends in large part on the details of the crime chosen by the
government, such as the quantity of drugs or presence of weapons.
393. United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 1994).
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process, but often does not rise to the violation-level of due
process required to dismiss charges or bar prosecution.394
The manipulative conduct of the government in reverse
stash-house stings often does not meet the outrageousness
standard for a due process violation, but the conduct does
still interfere with due process and thereby should warrant
relief on behalf of the defendant.
Sentencing factor manipulation should be argued as an
interference with due process. While it’s historical origins
can be traced to entrapment, the focus of the claim should be
on the impropriety of government’s actions, not the
predisposition of the defendant. The government’s conduct
should constitute manipulation that interferes with due
process warranting relief when it is found to arbitrarily
implicate the defendant’s liberty interests by inflating
sentence length.395 Sentencing factor manipulation occurs
where the government engages in improper conduct that has
the effect of increasing the defendant’s sentence, including,
but not limited to, engaging in a longer than needed
investigation, increasing the drug quantity for which the
394. Regarding the government’s custom design of both the crime and
punishment, one court stated:
The benefits of reverse sting operations . . . must be balanced against the
danger of granting law enforcement officials unlimited power to define
the scope of criminal culpability in a given case. The fact that a single
officer in the field can determine the amount of drugs in a case, and,
therefore, the length of sentence for a defendant, is a troubling scenario.
Such awesome power cannot go unchecked.
Commonwealth v. Petzold, 701 A.2d 1363, 1366 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
395. The Black court articulated this point well:
The agency creating the fictitious stash house can place any amount of
imaginary drugs within it. The amount must, no doubt, be plausible; this
limit aside, the ATF may make the object of the robbery as large as it
chooses . . . . The ATF has free rein to . . . influence the number of
defendants[,] . . . [and] invent[] armed guardians of the imaginary
drugs . . . . [N]othing stops the government from filing additional
charges and obtaining sentencing enhancements where the defendants,
at the government’s insistence, are found carrying explosives, body
armor, or machine guns.
United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 317–18 (9th Cir. 2013).

512

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

defendant is responsible, or introducing the need for
weapons. In evaluating a sentencing factor manipulation
claim, a court should consider factors such as:
the inherently arbitrary way in which stash house sting cases first
ensnare suspects; the immense power delegated to case agents who
can pre-ordain a sentence at the outset of the operation; the lack
any meaningful way to test the validity of the Government’s
justification for the amount of narcotics built into the sting; the lack
of a genuine nexus between the amount of narcotics proposed and
the defendant’s culpability; the lack of sufficient evidence . . . that
[the defendant] ever sought to deal at the level proposed by the
Government; the lack of a criminal record that unambiguously
demonstrates [the defendant] had a propensity for violence, aside
from his braggadocio; the risk that the sheer immensity of the
sentences that follow from such operations compels guilty pleas;
and the disparities in sentencing that are seemingly endemic to all
of these prosecutions because the structure of the sting mandates
lengthy imprisonment for any non-cooperator.396

The standard of conduct required to prove the claim
would be “arbitrary,” not the “outrageous” standard used for
outrageous government conduct claims. The dilemma courts
face in weighing their disdain for the behavior of the
government in reverse stash-house sting operations against
the high standard required for the outrageous government
conduct claim would be alleviated. While courts have not
found the government’s conduct in reverse stash-house sting
operations to be outrageous, they have found it to be
arbitrary.397 Arbitrary conduct is a more applicable standard
because of the opportunities the Guidelines pose for law
enforcement to gerrymander a defendant’s sentence.398 For
example, in United States v. Fontes, the ATF agent testified
he was “aware of the fact that there are guidelines that
determine what a sentence is for a particular drug
transaction, depending on what type of drug [is sold or
purchased]” and when asked by the court if he was trying to

396. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926, 943 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
397. See United States v. Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 3d 772 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
398. United States v. Sanchez, 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998).
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get a higher sentence for the defendant, the agent responded,
yes, “[t]hat’s a part of it.”399 By recognizing a sentencing
factor manipulation claim, courts would be expressly
acknowledging that law enforcement officers are not allowed
to structure reverse stash-house sting operations in such a
way as to maximize the sentence imposed on a defendant.
Government conduct would meet the standard for the
claim when it arbitrarily inflates a defendant’s sentence. The
standard should be lessened because a sentencing
manipulation claim derived from the outrageous government
conduct claim should parallel the same substantive and
procedural bounds as a sentencing entrapment defense
derived from an entrapment defense. Comparing
entrapment to sentencing entrapment, the substantive
standard is lower for the derived defense of sentencing
entrapment: a defendant must show he was not predisposed
to commit the criminal act (entrapment) versus a defendant
must show he was not predisposed to commit such a degree
of the criminal act (sentencing entrapment)—lack of
predisposition versus lack of some degree of predisposition.
Similarly, the substantive standard should be lower for the
derived claim of sentencing factor manipulation. On an
outrageous government conduct claim, a defendant must
show the government’s conduct was so outrageous as to
shock the conscience. Current law requires a defendant to
prove the same level of outrageousness on a sentencing factor
manipulation claim. This should not be the case. A defendant
bringing a sentencing factor manipulation claim should be
required to some lesser level of inappropriate government
conduct. Thus the claim and derived claim would come into
focus with entrapment and its derived defense—
outrageousness and some degree less than outrageousness.
The lesser degree of a substantive standard is logical
based on procedure. An entrapment defense is brought at
trial and is a basis upon which prosecution may be barred,
399. United States v. Fontes, 415 F.3d 174, 179 (1st Cir 2005).
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whereas sentencing entrapment is brought at sentencing
and is not a basis upon which prosecution may be barred, it
merely is a tool to reduce the sentence length. Likewise, an
outrageous government conduct claim is brought at trial and
is a basis upon which prosecution may be barred, whereas
sentencing manipulation is brought at sentencing and is not
a basis upon which prosecution may be barred, it merely is a
tool to reduce the sentence length. The consequences are less
severe for the success of a derived defense or claim and so
there is less risk in having a slightly lessened standard. 400
As relief for a successful claim, the district court should
filter out the government’s improper conduct from the
sentencing calculus. While a district court cannot disregard
a mandatory minimum,401 theoretically, an adjustment
based upon a sentencing factor manipulation claim is not a
downward departure.402 The district court will have filtered
the manipulative conduct out of the sentencing calculus
before a sentencing provision is applied—therefore, a
mandatory minimum would not have arisen to begin with.403
If a court finds a government action to be so objectionable
that it amounts to sentencing factor manipulation, the court
would simply remove that action and the mandatory
minimum it would trigger (from the sentencing calculus)

400. The court in Black demonstrated this point: “[d]ismissing an indictment
for outrageous government conduct [is such a severe consequence that it] is
‘limited to extreme cases’ in which the defendant can demonstrate that the
government’s conduct ‘violates fundamental fairness’ and is ‘so grossly shocking
and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice.’” 733 F.3d at 302
(quoting United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1209 (9th Cir. 2011). “This is
an ‘extremely high standard.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992
F.2d 896, 904 (9th Cir. 1993)).
401. Congress has only authorized a district court to depart downward from
the statutory mandatory minimum in two limited circumstances: where the
government files “a motion to recognize the defendant’s ‘substantial assistance,’”
or where the defendant falls within “the provisions of the ‘safety valve’ embodied
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f).” United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir.
2000).
402. United States v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007).
403. Id. at 1270.
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before the sentence is computed.404 However, in the case
where a minimum applies, success on the claim need “not be
limited to a request for a discretionary departure, . . . it
[should] appl[y] to statutory mandatory minimums as well
as to guideline ranges.”405 Recognizing a sentencing factor
manipulation claim would give greater discretion to the
sentencing courts—reminiscent of the pre-Booker days
where the Guidelines allowed courts to depart from the
Guidelines sentence where “the court [found] ‘that there
exist[ed] an aggravating or mitigating circumstance . . . that
should result in a sentence different from th[e one
described].’”406
Parts of this proposed claim have been successfully
applied in United States v. McLean.407 In McLean, McLean
was caught-up in a reverse stash-house sting operation and
faced a sentence of thirty-five years to life in prison with a
mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years.408 At
sentencing, McLean argued the government improperly
inflated his sentence by choosing a quantity of drug (fivekilograms of cocaine) that triggered a high mandatory

404. See id. at 1270 (giving an example: “[t]herefore, if the court found that
inserting the silencer in the gun was so objectionable that it amounted to
sentencing factor manipulation, that mandatory minimum would not apply
because the silencer would be taken out of the sentencing calculation.”).
Arguably, a finding of sentencing factor manipulation would authorize a court to
depart not only from the Guidelines sentencing range but also from the
mandatory minimum. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995).
405. Montoya, 62 F.3d at 4.
406. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C4.1 introductory cmt. (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). The Guidelines
specifically allow for departure in reverse sting operations if “the court finds that
the government agent set a price for the controlled substances that was
substantially below the market value . . . thereby leading to the defendant’s
purchase of a significantly greater quantity of the controlled substance”—a
quantity that would have been outside his means but became available because
of the reduced price. Id. at § 2D1.1 cmt. n.27(A).
407. United States v. McLean, 199 F. Supp. 3d 926 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
408. Id. at 928.
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minimum, and therefore his sentence should be reduced.409
McLean was convicted, but the court found that imposing a
sentence prescribed for the five-kilograms of cocaine would
have violated McLean’s constitutional right to due process of
law and therefore instead imposed a sentence that excluded
consideration of the five-kilograms of cocaine and the
corresponding mandatory minimum.410
CONCLUSION
Echoing down the hallways of federal courthouses are
the numerous warnings given by the federal judges presiding
over the ATF’s reverse stash-house sting cases, and they
have not hesitated in expressing their disdain for the
operations:411 the stings appear “highly susceptible to
abuse;”412 be “wary of [stash-house] operations;”413 the stings
are “a disreputable tactic;”414 “[z]ero[,] [t]hat’s the amount of
drugs that the Government has taken off the streets as the
result of . . . the hundreds of . . . fake stash-house cases;”415
“[t]he time has come to remind the Executive Branch that
the Constitution charges it with law enforcement—not crime
creation;”416 “into temptation the Government has gone,
ensnaring chronically unemployed individuals from povertyridden areas in its fake drug stash-house robberies;”417 the
Government “fire[s] [up] the imaginations of dreamers [with]
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. See United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017) for a collection
of cases criticizing reverse stash-house stings.
412. United States v. Hare, 820 F.3d 93, 103–04 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S.
Ct. 224, and reh’g denied, 137 S. Ct. 460 (2016).
413. United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2010).
414. United States v. Kindle, 698 F.3d 401, 414 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Jan. 16, 2013), on reh’g en
banc sub nom. United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417 (7th Cir. 2014).
415. United States v. Hudson, 3 F. Supp. 3d 772, 775 (C.D. Cal. 2014).
416. Id. at 788.
417. Id. at 775.
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easy wealth” and in turn becomes “the oppressor of its
people;”418 “[i]t is time for these false stash house cases to end
and be relegated to the dark corridors of our past;”419 “our
criminal justice system should not tolerate false stash house
cases in 2018.”420
The government should take heed of these advisements,
but in its failure to do so, federal courts should adopt a
sentencing factor manipulation claim applicable in reverse
stash-house sting cases. The claim would mitigate the fact
that the fictitious drugs, fictitious houses, fictitious players,
and fictitious robberies result in very non-fictitious sentences
for the targets of the operations. It would also protect the
fundamental liberty interest so threatened in these
operations. As James Madison penned,
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government which
is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in
this: you must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. 421

The only way to control the government in the cases of
reverse-stash house sting operations is to effectuate a
sentencing factor manipulation claim.

418. United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 318 (9th Cir. 2013) (Noonan, J.,
dissenting).
419. United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 983–84 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
420. Id. at 984. Many state courts strongly disfavor the type of sting as well:
“[t]he justice system should look with a jaundiced eye upon reverse sting
operations[, t]his effectively is the justice system becoming involved in
committing crime and not stopping it.” Leech v. State, 66 P.3d 987, 991 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2003) (Johnson, P.J., concurring).
421. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961).

